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Abstract
Static memory analysis has been proven a valuable technique for digital forensics.
However, the memory capture technique impacts the system by modifying important
dynamic system data, such as logged on users, network status, active processes, active
drivers, open files and open registry keys. As a result, live analysis techniques have
emerged to complement static analysis. In this paper, a compiled memory analysis tool
for virtualization (CMAT-V) is presented as a virtual machine introspection (VMI) utility
to conduct live analysis during cyber attacks. CMAT-V leverages static memory dump
analysis techniques to provide live system state awareness, which includes dynamic
system data. Live analysis means that CMAT-V can continually parse live dynamic
memory from an active guest operating system (OS). Unlike some VMI applications,
CMAT-V bridges the semantic gap using derivation techniques. The semantic gap refers
to the disconnect between raw data from dynamic memory and the OS-specific
contextual meaning. CMAT-V detects Windows-based operating systems and uses the
Microsoft Symbol Server to provide this context to the user. This technique provides
increased CMAT-V compatibility for current and future Windows-based operating
systems.
This research demonstrates the usefulness of CMAT-V as a situational awareness
tool during cyber attacks, tests the detection of CMAT-V from the guest system level and
measures its impact on host performance. During experimental testing, live system state
information was successfully extracted from two simultaneously executing virtual
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machines (VM’s) under four rootkit-based malware attack scenarios. For each malware
attack scenario, CMAT-V was able to provide evidence of the attack. Furthermore, data
from CMAT-V detection testing did not confirm detection of the presence of CMAT-V’s
live memory analysis from the VM itself. This supports the conclusion that CMAT-V
does not create uniquely identifiable interference in the VM itself. Finally, three different
benchmark tests reveal an 8% to 12% decrease in the host VM performance while
CMAT-V is executing.
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CYBER-SITUATIONAL AWARENESS USING LIVE
HYPERVISOR-BASED VIRTUAL MACHINE INTROSPECTION

I. Introduction
From the dawn of military aviation, strategic positions in air and space have been
leveraged for reconnaissance purposes.

Whether obtained by hot air balloons or

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), timely and trustworthy intelligence remains
paramount to execute strategic military operations.

With the emergence of the

cyberspace domain, such a privileged position is equally critical. General Robert Kehler,
Commander Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) highlights the “move from situational
awareness to situational comprehension” in cyberspace as a primary military objective
[Keh09]. Strategies outlined to accomplish this are to “fuse cyber intelligence to deliver
proactive, responsive operational cyber capabilities” and “develop, refine and apply data
mining and visualization technologies” in the cyber fight [Keh09]. In addition, the Air
Force Research Laboratory has identified the need to “detect and defeat threats through
active defenses” as a focused long term challenge (FLTC) [Tur08]. As cutting edge
virtualization technology continues to be utilized for military and commercial use, the
hypervisor provides this trusted higher-ground to obtain cyber situational awareness.
Desktop and server virtualization has emerged as an efficient and cost effective
alternative to traditional “one-box-per-user” systems for a given set of physical hardware.
In addition, new microprocessor architectures have emerged that are specifically
designed to support virtualization. Due to the hypervisors privileged view of the state of

1

its virtual machines (VMs), virtualization has been utilized as an effective environment
for forensic analysis and intrusion detection systems. The virtual machine manager
(VMM) located in the hypervisor provides a trusted view of system. As such, virtual
machine introspection (VMI) utilities have been developed to collect and analyze VM
state information. Because VMs are abstracted from the VMM itself, the hypervisor can
collect raw memory data from the VM. A VMI utility must also provide or derive VM
specific context in order to extract useful system state information [Hay08].

By

leveraging this information, network operators can quickly detect and engage cyber
threats.

1.1.

Goals
The goal of this research is to investigate the feasibility of live VMI analysis and

its effectiveness to provide a multidimensional view of the live system state. The tasks to
accomplish this are divided into the categories of software development and performance
testing.
Software Development
•

Create a prototype VMI tool that will access live VM memory, detect the OS
executing in the VM and extract system state information. This research covers
new ground in VMI research by using innovative techniques to analyze dynamic
VM memory in real time. The VMI prototype must be capable of extracting and
interpreting system state data without pausing the VM itself. Not only this, but
information about the OS running on the VM must not be explicitly provided to
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the VMI utility. Instead, this information must be passively detected. Success is
evaluated by the ability to engineer software that meets these conditions.

Performance Testing
•

Verify the dependability of live VM analysis while under cyber attack. For a
prototype VMI utility to be useful for network defense, it must be reliable while
the VM is under attack. The VMI program must present the user with relevant
and trustworthy information so that the health of the system can be determined.
For example, the prototype might be able to show the active process list of a
healthy system, but what if the VM is executing malicious software designed
specifically to evade detection? Furthermore, the methods used by malware to
hide its presence on the target system are numerous and are only limited by the
imagination of the attacker. To prove the dependability of the VMI utility, it must
show that it is capable of successfully providing evidence of several different
types of malware.

•

Verify the ability to conduct live analysis on two simultaneously executing VMs.
When using virtualization, it is desirable to run multiple VMs supported by the
same hypervisor. As such, using the VMI prototype, two different VMs executing
simultaneously must be analyzed to show that the prototype is not limited to one
VM, but can support multiple active VMs.

•

Evaluate the detectability of VM memory latency caused by live analysis. The
VMI prototype must also scan and analyze the VM’s dynamic memory without
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the VM noticing unique changes in performance. If malware executing in the VM
is able to detect the VMI sensor, it can react and cause additional damage to the
system. This goal uses selected benchmarks to objectively evaluate whether or not
the VMI prototype’s live analysis causes detectable memory latency noticeable
from the VM.
•

Measure the system resource overhead of the VMI utility on the host. This goal
addresses the impact of CMAT-V to the hypervisor itself. A VMI utility must not
excessively drain system resources such that the supported VMs cannot operate
effectively. Running the VMI prototype likely results in longer CPU times and
increased memory access time. These values must be quantified. Benchmarks are
used while the VMI prototype is not executing and then while under the stress of
the VMI prototype. The difference between these benchmark results is compared
to quantify the change in performance. This information allows the user to know
precisely what the impact the utility will have on the hypervisor.

1.2.

Assumptions
This research is be conducted under several assumptions. First, for accurate VM

analysis, the state of the VMM itself must be trustworthy. The VMM itself is assumed to
be uncompromised throughout the experiment. As such, it is assumed that complete VMto-VMM isolation exists. This also means that the VM cannot detect when the VMI
application is in use. Second, Windows is the only VM operating system tested during
this research effort. The United States Air Force (USAF) has entered a license agreement
with Microsoft to make Microsoft Windows part of the USAF Standard Desktop

4

Configuration [Lan10]. This leads to the third assumption that the OS follows the
software architecture and data structure format as defined by Microsoft.

Once the

Windows version is detected, the VMI test bed automatically looks up guest OS semantic
information by accessing Microsoft’s symbol server.

The VMI application uses

techniques that leverage known OS data structures. For example, the EPROCESS linked
list structure tracks active processes on the system [Rus09].

1.3.

Thesis Overview
This chapter presents an introduction to the research effort. The introduction

includes motivation, goals and assumptions made.
Chapter 2 provides background information on virtualization, virtual machine
introspection and related work in the area of VMI development. First the foundational
concepts behind virtualization are described and the differences between virtualization
implementations are highlighted. Then, the motivation for VMI is presented. A formal
model that characterizes VMI approaches is also discussed. Finally, using elements from
the formal model, an overview of several existing VMI applications is presented.
Chapter 3 describes the experimental methodology. First the problem definition
is stated. The next section outlines the approach used for VMI tool development. The
last section describes the experimental design used to test the tool’s effectiveness for
threat awareness as well as its system performance.
Chapter 4 presents the results of all experiments.
statistical analysis and describes the meaning of the results.
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This section includes all

Chapter 5 contains a summary of the results, conclusions made from the study as
well as recommendations for future work.
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II. Background
The following sections give an overview of fundamental concepts related to
virtualization and virtual machine introspection (VMI). Section 2.1 describes the concept
of virtualization and highlights the differences between virtualization methods.

In

Section 2.2, the motivation for VMI is presented along with a formal model for
characterizing VMI techniques. Finally, Section 2.3 presents an overview of several
different VMI applications.

2.1.

Virtualization
Virtualization is a technique in which hardware resources of a physical host

computer are shared to allow multiple guest operating systems (OSs) to run on a single
host machine. A general overview of a virtualized architecture is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Virtualization Architecture.
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Guest operating systems, known as virtual machines (VMs), run independently
from one another, completely unaware that other VMs exist. Hardware resources are
controlled by a hypervisor which interfaces between the physical hardware layer and
guest VMs. The hypervisor, or virtual machine monitor (VMM), abstracts the physical
hardware layer into virtualized hardware for VM use. The VM operates as if it is using
physical hardware, unaware of the abstraction that has taken place. The hypervisor
allocates either exclusive or shared host resources to the VM. Exclusive resources are
used because either the virtualization technology doesn’t allow sharing or the particular
application requires dedicated resources for certain VMs.

Whether resources are

exclusive or shared however, the number of ported VMs allowed on a particular system is
limited to the physical hardware resources of the host computer.

The minimum

requirements for a particular VM are dictated by the OS distribution and the
virtualization method used. At any time, the state of a VM can be saved to an image file
which can be quickly restored on the same machine or can be ported to other host
machines [Mat08][Gol08].
Virtualization is not a new concept. In fact, operating systems have been using
virtualization for quite some time, allowing the applications executing in the operating
system to simultaneously access and share hardware resources. In past implementations
however, hypervisors constrained users to a particular operating system which further
limited the system to only OS compatible applications. Current virtualization methods
more efficiently utilize the x86 protection ring architecture to allow different operating
systems to utilize system resources [Mat08][Gol08].
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2.1.1. Protection Ring Architecture
The x86 architecture contains four privilege levels that allow regulated access to a
system’s hardware resources. These privilege levels, as shown in Figure 2, are referred
to as rings and range from ring 0 (most privileged) to ring 3 (least privileged)
[Int10][Bar03].

Figure 2. Ring Protection Levels
[Int10].

A higher level ring (e.g., level 3) must request access to data structures and
routines from a lower level (e.g., level 0) [Sil10]. The main advantage of this structure is
its usefulness in debugging software.

Once lower ring level routines have been

debugged, higher ring levels may reliably use its lower level calls. Consequently, if an
error occurs, it can be assumed that the error was caused by the current layer under test.
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In non-virtualized architectures, critical code modules like the operating system kernel
typically reside in ring 0. This layer directly interacts with the hardware on the system.
With virtualization however, the hypervisor often runs in ring 0 as well. The interaction
between the hypervisor and the OS kernel depends on the method of virtualization used.
The difference between these methods will now be discussed.

2.1.2. Virtualization Methods
The four main virtualization methods in use today are OS virtualization, hardware
emulation, full virtualization and paravirtualization.

The three main elements that

differentiate virtualization methods are the location of the virtualization layer, the
modification required for the guest operating systems and the performance impact of
virtualization on the system. The similarities and differences of each method will be
discussed in the following sections.

2.1.2.1. OS Virtualization
With operating system virtualization, the same OS as the host is installed on top
of an existing operating system kernel. These isolated program execution environments
are referred to as virtual environments (VE). Similar to a VM, the processes that run in a
VE are isolated from each other (each having its own IP address, software configurations,
etc); however, the resources they share are not isolated. OS virtualization does not use
the VMM to control use of physical resources. If one VE decides to take resources for
itself, it negatively affects the performance of the other VEs. Each VE is also referred to
as a container that isolates its operation from the other VEs [Kol06][SWs05].
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Figure 3. Operating System Virtualization
Adapted from[Gol08].
During OS virtualization, the host operating system executes virtualization
software allowing multiple guest functionality. As shown in Figure 3, the container
virtualization layer interacts with the host OS kernel to coordinate between the VEs and
the underlying hardware. Each VE must be the same OS as the host; therefore no
modification is required to the guest OS.
The benefit of this method is that it requires the least amount of hypervisor
overhead to implement due to shared OS processes. Hypervisor overhead involves using
system resources like CPU and memory. Despite the benefit of a thinner hypervisor, the
VEs are still limited to same OS as the host which makes OS virtualization inflexible.
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For many users, OS virtualization is insufficient because it cannot support different
operating systems on the same physical system. Examples of OS virtualization include:
OpenVZ [Kol06], Virtuozzo [Par10], Linux VServers [Pot09] and FreeBSD jails [Fre10].

2.1.2.2. Hardware Emulation
In hardware emulation, as shown in Figure 4, hypervisor emulation software
creates emulated versions of the underlying physical hardware.

Figure 4. Hardware Emulation
Adapted from [Gol08].
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This emulated hardware environment acts as a VMM and is compatible with OS
specific system calls. When a guest OS makes a system call, the VM interacts only with
the emulated hardware provided by the hypervisor. The hypervisor then translates the
calls from the emulated hardware and sends them to the physical hardware. This method
allows the host to support a virtual machine of a foreign computing architecture [Bia06].
For example, if an Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) microprocessor is used, hardware
emulation could still support an OS that might require an Intel microprocessor. As a
result, hardware emulation offers great OS flexibility.

However, due to the high

overhead required to translate instructions from different architectures to that of the host,
this method greatly decreases system performance [Sun10].

For this reason some

hardware emulation software developers advertize decreased CPU performance ranging
from 1/500 to 1/15 the speed of the host [Bia06]. Examples of hardware emulation
include: PearPC [Bia06] and Bochs [Law09].

2.1.2.3. Full Virtualization
Full virtualization is similar to hardware emulation because it also allows
different unmodified operating systems to run inside a virtual machine.

With full

virtualization however, instead of making calls to emulated hardware, the virtual machine
guests run code directly on the physical hardware used by the host. Compatibility issues
between a guest OS and the underlying architecture are handled by the hypervisor using a
technique called binary translation. Binary translation is a technique used to intercept
instructions calls made by an OS for a particular architecture and convert the instructions
so that they can be recognized by a non-native architecture [Sit93].
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Figure 5. Full Virtualization
Adapted from [Mat08].
As shown in Figure 5, rather than emulating the whole hardware architecture, full
virtualization uses the hypervisor to conduct real time binary translation which makes
VM instructions compatible with the architecture of the host. The VMM in this case, still
regulates which VM’s have access to the host’s resources, but once given access, the
guest VM’s have direct access to the physical hardware [Mat08][Gol08].
As virtualization has become more popular, hardware developers such as Intel and
AMD have created the Intel VT and AMD-V architectures to better support virtualization
[Int10][Adv10].

This technology is commonly referred to as hardware assisted
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virtualization (HAV). In HAV, new hardware extensions and privilege sublevels are
introduced to specifically manage VM control.

Utilizing HAV improves binary

translation performance or removes the need for it altogether [Int10].

Though full

virtualization requires some overhead for the hypervisor layer controls, it allows VMs to
run at near-native performance of the host [Sun10]. Examples of full virtualization
include: VMware Server [VMw10b], ESX Server [VMw10a] and VirtualBox [Sun10].

2.1.2.4. Paravirtualization
All of the previously discussed virtualization methods required a host operating
system kernel to execute priority system calls to the hypervisor which translated the calls
for native hardware compatibility. Paravirtualization, however, presents a guest OS with
a modified version of the actual physical hardware that allows VM’s direct access to
lower level hardware. Xen, an open source paravirtualization package, allows hypercalls
to be used rather than typical system calls to access privileged system resources. This
allows the same memory to be accessed by two different processes. Paravirtualization
also is particularly helpful in sharing information between VMs [Mat08].
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Figure 6. Xen Paravirtualization
Adapted from [Gol08].
As shown on the left half of Figure 6, in order for paravirtualization to take place
each VM OS must be compatible with the architecture of the underlying VMM. In light
of this requirement, the OS kernel for each VM must be slightly modified to ensure
compatibility with the Xen hypervisor. Though only small changes to the OS kernel are
necessary, this modification is not possible with closed-source operating systems such as
Microsoft Windows. For this reason, Xen also supports full virtualization utilizing HAV
technology as shown on the right half of Figure 6. These HAV VMs or hardware virtual
machines (HVMs) can be built around both open source and closed source operating
systems [Mat08].
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Similar to typical ring protection, Xen paravirtualization utilizes a domain level
architecture. The privileged domain (Dom0) is equivalent to ring 0 while user domain
(DomU) refers to rings 1 through 3.

Similar to previously discussed virtualization

methods, a Dom0 hypervisor manages resource allocation of the underlying physical
hardware. In the case of a Dom0 hypervisor, user level software resides in DomU with
the operating system kernel in ring 1 and the user applications in ring 3 [Mat08].
In addition, Xen provides a special domain to hold the device drivers for the guest
VMs.

This domain is called the driver domain.

The purpose of offloading driver

complexity from Dom0 is to make the system more stable should a driver error occur.
With this design, the driver can be stopped and restored without crashing the whole
system.
The primary advantages of paravirtualization are its low overhead for the VMM
layer and high performance due to direct access to the physical hardware. The main
disadvantage with paravirtualization is its moderate inflexibility because it requires
modification to the guest OS source code. This limitation has been remedied however
with the introduction of HAV technology.

Examples of paravirtualization software

include: Xen [Mat08] and User-mode Linux (UML) [Dik10].

2.1.3. Benefits of Virtualization
There are many potential benefits that come with virtualization. These benefits
include but are not limited to increased hardware efficiency, lower network maintenance
costs, effective malware isolation and a more robust environment for software testing.
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2.1.3.1. Increased Hardware Efficiency
As hardware performance increases according to Moore’s law, computing
resources are often underutilized [Mat08][Gol08]. Virtualization has recently emerged as
a solution to this problem. By allowing several VMs to utilize hardware resources on a
single machine, virtualization provides network administrators with increased hardware
efficiency. This is particularly advantageous as systems now include multiple cores and
increased RAM sizes. As a result, fewer physical systems need to be purchased to
accomplish equivalent tasks. For example, virtualization has been proposed as a low cost
solution for creating realistic training environments for cyber security education [Ste09].
Virtualization allows organizations to leverage existing network PCs rather than upgrade
to new hardware.

2.1.3.2. Lower Maintenance Cost
Another benefit of virtualization is decreased network maintenance cost. As the
number of physical systems decrease, so does the workload for system maintenance
personnel to replace parts, monitor resource usage, etc. Virtualization also allows remote
updating of new software or VM images.

2.1.3.3. Effective Malware Isolation
Despite the fact that the security implications of virtualization are highly debated,
virtualization has been shown to provide some degree security benefits [Mor09].
Because guest VMs are isolated from the host system, virtualization tools can be used
against malware attacks to effectively sandbox the compromised VM from the rest of the
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network. The compromised VM can be then ported to another host to be analyzed while
a clean copy of the VM image can then be loaded to restore the system to a safe state.

2.1.3.4. Robust Software Testing Environment
Virtualization provides developers a stable system in which to test new OS
software. Because each VM is isolated from the underlying host, an OS experiencing a
system crash in a VM does not take down the whole system. Developers can quickly
restore the VM without having to make a hard reboot of the system.

2.2.

Virtual Machine Introspection
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is defined as “… [An] approach of

inspecting a virtual machine from the outside for the purpose of analyzing the software
running inside it” [Gar03]. The following section describes the motivation for VMI, the
semantic gap challenge between the VM and the VMM, a formal model used to describe
VMI, methods for VMI detection and finally an overview of the capabilities of existing
VMI applications.

2.2.1. Motivation
The emergence of VMI is closely coupled to the increased interest in
virtualization over the last several years. The idea of live analysis of systems however is
not a new concept. The following sections describe some of the limitations of static
analysis that brought about the need for live analysis techniques.
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2.2.1.1. Static Analysis
Static analysis refers to the traditional approach where a target system is halted so
that all storage media can be copied and used for forensic analysis. Over time statistic
analysis tools such as Encase [Gui10] and FTK [Acc10] have proven their value to locate
and extract useful information.

Static analysis alone, however, is limited in the

information provided. Shutting down the system could cause system updates to install or
the termination of running applications, both of which significantly affect storage media.
Similarly, pulling the plug can cause significant data inconsistencies and synchronization
issues [Hay09]. Halting the target system also results in a loss of all volatile system
information. Data such as open ports, active network connections, running programs,
temporary data, user interaction, encryption keys, RAM and cache are unrecoverable. If
the encryption key is lost for protected volumes, recovery techniques must be used which
are not always successful. Lastly, the downtime required to analyze the system poses a
great inconvenience to the user. These limitations highlight the need to supplement
traditional static analysis with live analysis techniques [Hay09].

2.2.1.2. Live Analysis
Nonquiescent or live analysis allows the forensic investigator to interrogate the
system while it is running. Live analysis techniques include using installed user level
applications [Sym10][Sou10][Wir10], using imported utilities (i.e., CD-ROM, USB, etc.)
[DMZ10], implementing system modifications (i.e., dividing production and security
processes on different processors) [Wil05] or using additional hardware (i.e., a PCI
hardware expansion card memory scanner) [Car04]. With these approaches, investigators
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have access to both static and dynamic memory as well as information about processes
currently in execution. In spite of these benefits however, these non-virtualized live
analysis methods have several drawbacks. Live analysis is susceptible to observer effects
such that any probing done to the system inadvertently changes the state of the system
itself. This makes preserving the integrity of the system state while using live analysis
particularly difficult. In addition, if the system is compromised, the attackers can modify,
hide or deny access to system data [Hay09]. However, using VMI for live analysis
overcomes many of these challenges.
VMI inherently provides a more secure environment for live analysis to take place
by allowing isolation, inspection and interposition [Gar03]. VMs are at a lower privilege
than the VMM; therefore, the VM is not aware of or given access to the underlying
hardware that supports its virtual hardware [Hay09]. This makes the VMM a prime
candidate for system monitoring processes.

The monitoring process is completely

isolated and therefore is not susceptible to malicious modification. In addition, the VMM
has complete access to inspect the state of the VM. The VMM can acquire the VM’s raw
state which includes CPU state, all memory, I/O device states and I/O controller states
[Gar03]. Finally, a VMI-based monitoring system allows a preconfigured VMM to
interpose on certain virtual machine operations and flag when a VM attempts particular
actions [Gar03].
Though the privileged level of the VMM allows complete oversight of the VM
state, knowing where to look within OS specific data structures is not a trivial task and is
discussed in the following section.
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2.2.2. The Semantic Gap
A well known challenge in VMI research is the lack of specific knowledge of the
guest VM’s state, commonly referred to as the semantic gap [Che01]. The word semantic
is defined as, “of or relating to meaning in language” [Mer10]. Because the interface
between the VMM and the VM is inherently designed to isolate the guest VM, it is
difficult for the VMM to interpret meaningful state information from raw VM data.
Semantic information includes but is not limited to hardware architectures, operating
systems, data structures, running processes, system functions, performance goals and
security policies. This semantic information is important for meaningful live analysis of
VMs.

For example, information obtained by probing VM system memory can be

complex to interpret without knowledge of the VM’s OS specific architecture. As a
result, many VMI applications require a priori semantic information as a road map to
effectively monitor VM activity. This approach decreases VMI compatibility however
because it closely couples the VMM to a specific operating system [Jon08].
Previous work has addressed the need for implicit semantic abstraction for both
hardware [Bug97][Siv04][Wal02] and software [Pag09][Gar03].

For example, by

analyzing a VM’s semantic performance at a hardware level, a VMM can reallocate least
valuable pages in memory leading to more efficient memory utilization [Wal02].
Similarly, it has been shown that information about a particular OS running on a VM can
also be extracted [Pag09]. Using known OS data structures, a VMM can detect the
particular version of an operating system running in a guest VM.
investigators can more strategically analyze VM activity.
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Knowing this,

Specific implementations of

VMI methods will be discussed more in following sections, but first a more formal model
for VMI is discussed to more precisely differentiate these techniques.

2.2.3. VMI Model
In [Pfo09], Pfoh, Schneider and Eckert highlight three main challenges VMI must
overcome as (1) interpreting binary low-level data that comprise the system state to
obtain abstract high level state information, (2) identifying the relevant parts of that state
information and (3) classifying system state. With these challenges in mind, a formal
model for VMI is proposed.
In the formal VMI model there are several terms used to describe VMI
characteristics. First, S is the set of all guest system states where s  S represents a
particular system state. Sint is the set of all VM states visible to the guest OS being
monitored where Sint ⊆ S. This includes all introspection, like using a kernel debugger,
which can be conducted inside the VM itself. Sext represents all possible states visible to
an external source, like the VMM, where Sext ⊆ S. In addition, C is defined as the set of
all possible classifications for a particular scenario.

The ideal goal for a VMI

implementation is to create some function f : Sint → C or g : Sext → C that outputs a
classification for a particular state. Because the characteristics that qualify as the system
state are theoretically unbounded, a view must be generated to reduce the scope of the
data. A view V ideally contains only data relevant to determining classification. Vint and
Vext refer to the set of all possible views constructible from Sint and Sext respectively
[Pfo09].
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The function that takes a state s and outputs a corresponding view v is made
possible by a view generating function. This process uses knowledge about the guest
system hardware and/or software architecture. A particular virtual hardware architecture
description is defined as λ, and a guest system software architecture is defined as µ.
Additionally, a profile p is defined as an aggregation of several consecutive views of a
system run where P represents the set of all possible profiles. The aggregation a takes all
profiles along with the current profile to create a new profile.

The profile is then

processed by function d to determine the classification of the current state. The following
functions are defined formally below [Pfo09].
, :
, :
: 







   
: 





Where fλ,µ describes internal view-generation; gλ,µ describes external view-generation; a
describes aggregation; d describes classification.
The information flow for the VMI model is shown in Figure 7 below. Using this
model, unique VMI implementations can be more precisely described. As such, elements
from this model will be referenced throughout the remainder of the paper.
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Figure 7. VMI Model Information Flow
[Pfo09].
2.2.4. VMI View-Generation
Generation
The stage of the VMI model of interest to this research is the view generating
functions that begin with a state s and output a corresponding view v. In this step the
semantic gap is bridged, providing the investigator not only with raw data, but with
meaning behind the data. The following describes three view
view-generation
generation methods that
differ based on where the view
view-generation
eneration takes place (internal or external) and the type
of semantic information used in the generating function
function. These methods may be used
individually or in combination [Pfo09].

2.2.4.1. Out-of-Band
Band Delivery
The most prevalently used approach to VMI view generation is referred to as outout
of-band delivery which uses a priori semantic knowledge about the guest VM software
architecture. With this advanced knowledge
knowledge, the VMM queries the VM externally (outof-band) to deliver specific state information. A formal description is shown below
[Pfo09].
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Implementing out-of-band delivery of VM state information, also referred to as
explicit information [Jon08], has both advantages and disadvantages.

Because the

information is gathered by the VMM, the VMI application has an omniscient view of the
VM state. Utilizing the VMM maintains isolation from attacks to the VMI itself. View
consistency is also maintained by interrogating the VM while it is in a paused state. The
main disadvantage of out-of-band delivery is that it inherently relies on semantic
information about a particular OS architecture. If the assumptions made about the VM’s
software architecture change (via patches, updates, etc.) the VMI method is often
rendered invalid [Pfo09].

Any information gathered with this method would be

considered nonbinding. This term describes the common occurrence where malware is
not bound to maintain the semantics implied by the OS symbol information. When
considering rootkits for example, “ if the hypervisor uses non-binding information about
the format or location of kernel data structures, the rootkit may evade detection by adding
fields to the data structures or moving the data structures to a memory location that is not
being monitored” [Lit08]. A VMI utility that doesn’t adapt to changes made in OS patch
updates runs the risk of reporting an invalid view of the system state.
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2.2.4.2. In-Band Delivery
In-band delivery of information originates from the guest VM. Using inherent OS
knowledge of software architecture and function, the system state is reported to the
VMM. A formal description is shown below [Pfo09].
 











Though the guest OS has the most accurate semantic information about the software
architecture, there are several disadvantages to this approach. First, this method relies
heavily on the trustworthiness of the VM. Rootkits, for example, designed to hide
applications could compromise data reported by the guest OS [Hog06]. This would mean
that the function  would give an inaccurate view of the system state. In addition, the
system cannot be paused which could cause inconsistency issues. By the time the view
generation function reports the system state to the user, the VM system state might have
changed.

Finally, because the view-generating function resides within the VM, the

function is likely to interfere with the system state itself [Pfo09].
In-band delivery is most commonly used in combination with other methods for
view comparison. If two views report differing results, this informs the investigator that
the VM is possibly compromised.
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2.2.4.3. Derivation
Derivation, also referred to as implicit introspection [Jon08], uses semantic
hardware architecture information to derive a view of the system state. This more
passive approach relies on hardware specific activity such as interrupts, page faults, and
I/O requests [Wil05]. The derivation method is described formally below [Pfo09].
 





    





Because this method uses semantic information about the system hardware
architecture this approach overcomes the non-binding nature of the methods discussed
previously. In addition, this method reports the true system state even if the guest OS has
been compromised. Unless malware alters external interfaces, all running processes must
function within the bounds of the virtual and physical hardware architecture. There are
disadvantages to the derivation approach however.

Interpretation of hardware level

activity is a more difficult task than analysis at a software level. Low level activity
provides little or no context for extract user level intentions. In light of this, the view
generated from guest system state information is limited in scope [Jon08][Pfo09].

2.2.4.4. Combination
As mentioned previously, using a combination of in-band, out-of-band and/or
derivation methods for view-generation can provide a more complete and accurate view
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of the system state. For example cross view validation can be used to determine the
differences between information reported by the VM and what is gathered by the VMM
[Wan05]. A summary of the properties for each of these methods is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of View-Generation Properties
[Pfo09].
Property
HW Portability
Guest OS Portability
Binding
Isolation from Guest OS
Inspection of Suspended VM
Full State Visibility

Delivery
in-band
out-of-band


-





Derivation






Though leveraging the strengths of each method discussed can be effective, applying
multiple approaches will not necessarily produce the desired results. When selecting or
combining view generation methods, suitability and unwanted interaction effects must
also be considered [Pfo09].

2.3.

Related Work
An executive summary of previous work in the area of VMI is shown in Table 2.

Many VMI systems have been developed for general VM monitoring, intrusion detection
and event replay. In the sections to follow, each VMI application is briefly discussed in
further detail.
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Table 2. Executive Summary of Existing VMI Applications.
Sec.

2.3.1

Name

Introvirt

VMM(s)
Tested

UMLinux

OS(s)
Tested

Linux

VMI Pattern

Description

Limitations

Ref.

In-band

Uses vulnerability-specific
knowledge to invoke code on
guest OS for system state
reporting.

If compromised, VM
cannot be trusted.
Non-binding.

[Jos05]

OS interface library
must be provided.
Requires VM
interference.
Non-binding.

[Gar03]

2.3.2

Livewire

VMWare

Linux

Out-of-Band

Interperets system state via
VMM to access VM memory.
Uses provided OS interface
library for semantic context.
Uses hooking for intrusion
detection.

2.3.3

XenAccess

Xen

Windows
Linux

Out-of-Band

Uses user-provided OS
semantic info to map VM
memory.

OS information must be
provided. Non-binding.

[Pay07]

2.3.4

Lares

Xen

Windows

In & Out-ofBand

Uses trampoline in VM to
intercept events.

VM interference.
Non-binding.

[Pay08]

2.3.5

VIX

Xen

Linux

Out-of-Band

Pauses VM, accesses VM
memory, displays system data.

VM interference.
Non-binding.

[Hay08b]

OS templates must be
provided. Vulnerable to
malware that targets
COTS anti-malware
software. Non-binding.

[Jia07]

2.3.6

VMWatcher

VMWare, Xen,
QEMU, UML

Windows
Linux

Out-of-Band

Accesses VM state using user
provided OS templates then
uses COTS anti-malware
software to make classification.

2.3.7

AntFarm

Xen, Simics

Windows
Linux

Derivation

Tracks process creation,
context switches and exits.

No user level context or
VM-state classification.

[Jon06]

Xen

Windows
Linux

Derivation

Uses Ant Farm data along with
CPU inflation technique to
compare the lengths of process
lists at trusted and non-trusted
levels.

VM interference.

[Jon08]

Xen

Windows
Linux

Derivation

Assigns, tracks, and revokes
code execution. Applications
submit trusted code hashes and
Manitou and disallows any
untrusted code execution.

Dependant on hashes
from applications.

[Lit06]

Dependant on trusted
binaries from
administrator.

[Lit08]

2.3.8

2.3.9

LycosID

Manitou

2.3.10

Patagonix

Xen

Windows
Linux

Derivation

Identifies covertly executing
binaries. Administrator provides
white-list of legitimate binaries
and Patagonix disallows any
untrusted code to ececute.

2.3.11

Revirt

UMLinux

Linux

Derivation

Allows VM execution replay by
creating VM checkpoints.

Requires knowledge of
VM compromise. Does
not allow live analysis.

[Dun02]

Derivation

Implements training period to
Dependant on trustworty
observe interaction between OS
training period results.
and VMM. Abnormal kernel
No user-level context.
handler functions are flagged.

[Sri10]

2.3.12

Wizard

Xen

Linux
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2.3.1. Introvirt
Introvirt [Jos05] is a VMI system designed to monitor the execution of guest OS
applications. The system uses a User Mode Linux VMM to support Linux guest and host
VMs. Introvirt uses in-band view generation by executing code that already exists in the
guest.

Figure 8. IntroVirt System Structure
[Jos05].
An overview of the IntroVirt system architecture is shown in Figure 8. The system
leverages specific OS semantic knowledge, including OS vulnerabilities, to determine the
system state. This semantic knowledge is referred to as a predicate. These predicates
must be provided to Introvirt and are then used to detect the triggering of the
vulnerability. During predicate execution, guest specific functions are used to present
data back to the system. Classification of the system state can only occur after the
vulnerability has already been discovered. With this method however, limitations of inband view generation still apply. Data provided by a compromised guest cannot be
trusted.
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2.3.2. Livewire
As shown in Figure 9, Livewire [Gar03] uses an out-of-band view generation
pattern by utilizing an OS interface library containing OS specific semantic information.

Figure 9. Livewire Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Architecture
[Gar03].
Livewire can interpret the state of the VM by using the VMM to access pages from
physical memory in combination with an OS interface library to provide context. Using
VM hooks, the VMI intrusion detection system (IDS) communicates with the VMM to
send event notification. The IDS then suspends the VM until given an administrative
command to continue. Once the VM state has been retrieved, a policy engine component

32

determines the classification of the VM state. Livewire uses a VMWare VMM to support
Linux guest and host VMs.

2.3.3. XenAccess
XenAccess [Pay07] monitors VM operating systems running on Xen
virtualization software. XenAccess uses an out-of-bound view generation pattern. Using
a priori semantic information about the VM operating system, XenAccess can map
memory pages from domU to a local address range. An example of mapping using a
kernel symbol is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10. XenAccess VMI Using a Kernel Symbol
[Pay07].
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As shown in step 2 of Figure 10, a file system.map is used which contains OS
specific kernel symbol information which is used to probe the guest VM.
VM Using this
information, XenAccess then enters the VM’s dynamic memory to gather raw system
state data. In order to gather the raw data
data, XenAccess uses the Xen’s libxc and
libxenstore libraries which provide functions to interface with the VM itself. For
example, XenAccess uses the xc_map_foreign_range()function from libxc to
view the memory of a guest VM
VM. XenAccess supports VMI for both Linux and Windows
based VMs.

2.3.4. Lares
XenAccess
enAccess along with OS specific
Lares [Pay08] utilizes the functionality of X
hooking locations
tions to monitor process creation events. In-band and out-of
of-band view
generation is implemented for the Lares IDS system. The overall Lares architecture is
shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11. High-level
level View of the Lares Architecture and its Core Components
[Pay08].
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Through the use of a trampoline in the guest VM, the security VM intercepts events.
This feature signifies an in-band technique. The security VM which is external to the
guest VM then uses matching algorithms and heuristics to actively process the event.
This feature signifies an out-of-band technique. Finally, a classification decision is made
for the event. Though this is an effective approach it is not free from VM interference.
The hooks installed in the guest VM inherently modify the VM state.

2.3.5. VIX
Virtual introspection for Xen (VIX) [Hay08] uses an out-of-band view generation
pattern, where offset values based on the DomU system under examination are initialized
upon VM creation. VIX utilizes the Xen Control Library to first pause the VM, access
and decode memory, then unpause the VM to continue execution. This procedure is
demonstrated by the pseudo-code example of the vix-ps utility shown below.
Pause DomU
Adr <- Address of Task List Head
Do
Adr <- Adr.next_task_adr
Map page(s) for Adr into Dom0
Decode task_struct
Display data
Unmap page(s) with Adr
While (Adr != Address of Task List Head)
UnPause DomU
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This utility lists the current processes being run in the VM. Using this utility enables
VIX to conduct cross-view validation to detect basic rootkits. Though a classification is
not made about the state of the VM, VIX gives the VMM contextual VM situational
awareness. VIX has been shown to operate on Linux based VMs.

2.3.6. VMWatcher
VMWatcher [Jia07] is an IDS that uses an out-of-bounds view generation
technique called guest view casting. This technique involves using guest OS semantic
information as templates to interpret low-level VM states. The unique feature about
VMWatcher is that it utilizes off-the-shelf anti-malware software to determine
classifications on VM states.

Figure 12. The VMWatcher Approach
[Jia07].
As shown in Figure 12, these anti-malware systems run inside the host OS and in
the VM itself. This allows VMWatcher to conduct cross-view validation by comparing
anti-malware software results from the guest VM and the hypervisor host. Within the
VM itself, the anti-malware systems can scan objects such as kernel modules (left circle),
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processes (middle circle) and files (right). VMWatcher supports VMWare, Xen, QEMU
and UML virtualization systems. Though this is an effective approach, this method is
vulnerable to malware that targets commercially available anti-malware software.

2.3.7. Ant Farm
Antfarm [Jon06] uses a derivation view-generation pattern by observing how a
guest uses a virtual memory management unit (MMU).

Process creation, context

switches and exits are monitored by tracking address spaces in which a process event
occurs. The process identification techniques used by Antfarm are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Antfarm Process Identification Techniques [Jon06].

In order to track addresses spaces they are labeled with an address space identifier
(ASID). By observing the ASID associated with an event it is possible to identify events
such as process creation, process exit and context switching. To assign the ASID for the
x86 architecture the physical address of the page directory is used; for the SPARC
architecture, the virtual address space context ID is used. For each event of interest
(creation, exit and context switch), Antfarm watches for certain activities to take place.
These activities differ depending on the architecture used and are shown in Table 3. By
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associating the activities with events of interest, Antfarm is able to draw conclusions
about what how the MMU is being used.
Though no classification is made on the VM state, the VMM can extract useful
system state information. Because Antfarm does not require explicit information about
the layout or implementation of memory, the VMI technique is independent of the VM
operating system.

Antfarm supports Xen and Simics VMM’s and runs Linux or

Windows as the guest OS.

2.3.8. LycosID
LycosID [Jon08] implements an IDS that uses derivation to obtain guest process
information. LycosID leverages Antfarm’s ability to obtain a trusted view of the guest
operating system then conducts cross-view validation to detect hidden processes. Finding
hidden processes involves two steps. First, the difference H in CPU time observed by the
VMM and the VM is calculated. Then a technique called CPU inflation is used that
inflates the CPU load of a given process. If H increases as a result of the inflation, it is
likely that the particular process is being hidden from the VM. This approach requires
that the hidden process is not idle. Though CPU inflation is an effective technique, it is
intrusive because it modifies the state of the VM itself.

2.3.9. Manitou
Manitou [Lit06] uses derivation at the microprocessor level for intrusion
detection. Each new application must submit a signed list of code page hashes through a
trusted path between the application and Manitou. A white list is created from the hashes
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and is maintained by Manitou.

Using semantic information about the underlying

microprocessor, Manitou monitors each time a program tries to execute code from a
specific page. If Manitou has not already marked the page executable, a page fault
occurs. The page is then hashed and compared to the white list of allowable hashes. If
the hash is found in the list, the code is allowed to execute, if not the unauthorized
program is terminated. Manitou has been shown to run with the Xen hypervisor which
supports Linux or Windows based operating systems [Lit06].

2.3.10. Patagonix
Patagonix [Lit08], similar to Manitou, uses derivation to look at microprocessor
events; however, Patagonix focuses primarily on detecting hidden rootkits running in a
VM. Figure 13 shows an overview of the Patagonix architecture.

Figure 13. The Patagonix Architecture.
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As shown on the right side of the Patagonix VM in Figure 13, Patagonix keeps a white
list of identity oracles which are created for each type of binary in the monitored VM.
On the left side of the Patagonix VM, control logic compares executed code to the
identity oracles and then presents the results with the management console interface
between the user and Patagonix. Because Patagonix does not rely on the guest OS, an
objective list of all running binaries is presented to the user. With this information, the
user can kill malicious binaries running on the VM. There is also a lie-detection mode
that uses cross-view validation between Patagonix and the VM OS to report hidden
binaries. Similar to Manitou, Patagonix uses the Xen VMM and supports Linux and
Windows based VMs.

2.3.11. Revirt
Revirt [Dun02] is an IDS that uses derivation techniques to enable event replay of
a VM.

A log is kept of every non-deterministic event that affects a process’s

communication while the VM is running.

Deterministic events include arithmetic

computations, memory calculations, branch instructions that will re-execute the same
way during replay. Non-deterministic events include the time an event occurred (to log
interrupts for example) and any external input (such as input from a human). Revirt is
designed to run on the UMLinux VMM. UMLinux uses software to emulate peripherals,
system calls and interrupts. By tracking these emulation mechanisms, Revirt is able to
identify the non-deterministic events. Periodic checkpoints of the system state are also
created by suspending the VM. If an attack occurs, the VM state before, during and after
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the attack can be restored, replayed and analyzed. This IDS approach is inherently
reactionary and requires the administrator to know when the VM has been compromised.

2.3.12. Wizard
Wizard [Sri10] uses a derivation approach to detect kernel attacks. Developed for
the Xen VMM, Wizard observes the interaction between the OS and the VMM rather
than the memory state of the OS itself. Wizard enters a training period to record and
characterize requests by applications running on the VM and the calls to the kernel. After
the training period, Wizard checks for anomalies in the behavior of kernel handler
functions. An example of the differences in normal and abnormal behavior is shown in
Figures 14 and 15.

Figure 14. Normal Behaviors for read Kernel Service Handler [Sri10].

Figure 15. Abnormal Behaviors for read Kernel Service Handler [Sri10].
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In Figure 14, each line shows the call sequence behaviors learned during the
training period for the read system call executed when typing on the keyboard. Each
call includes the system call with their parameter values and the associated interrupt
handler. Figure 15 shows the behavior observed after the LVTES keylogger is installed.
The lines in boldface indicate those behaviors that do not correlate. These abnormal
behaviors can then be further investigated to determine if malware is present.
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III. Methodology
The following sections detail the development of a compiled memory analysis
tool for virtualization (CMAT-V) and the experimental methodology used during the
research effort. Section 3.1 states the problem definition. Section 3.2 outlines the
software development approach used accomplish the goal of creating a CMAT-V. Recall
from Section 1.2 that this goal requires the prototype to access live VM memory, detect
the OS executing in the VM and extract system state information. Section 3.3 describes
the experimental design for performance testing. This addresses the goals to test VMI
cyber threat awareness, demonstrate multiple VM supportability, evaluate live analysis
detection and measure host system overhead (see Section 1.2).

3.1.

Problem Definition
Existing VMI applications are designed to leverage specific activities and

architectures found in hardware or software to extract dynamic system state information
about a guest VM. VMI techniques that target microprocessor-level hardware activities
are effective at collecting data; however the results they provide are conceptually separate
from user-level context. This separation limits the scope of system state information that
can be derived. VMI tools that target software characteristics are privy to user-level
context which allows the tool to provide a more detailed perspective of the system state.
As a consequence however, many software based VMI tools require a priori OS semantic
information to effectively extract useful forensic information. This limits the portability
of such tools to operating systems of different distributions or versions. Also, such

43

techniques are often strictly tied to specific data structures in dynamic memory to extract
information. This can provide an incomplete view of the system state by limiting the
range of dynamic memory investigated. Other techniques have the potential to interfere
with the state or execution of the VM itself. This interference could contaminate the VM
itself or allow the inspection to be detected by the guest. This research investigates the
feasibility of developing a non-interfering VMI tool that conducts a complete scan of
dynamic memory.

In addition, OS detection techniques are applied in an effort to

objectively extract contextual VM system state information.

3.2.

CMAT-V Software Developmental Approach
This section describes the overall software design of CMAT-V, modifications

required for software integration and modifications to improve live analysis performance.

3.2.1. Overall Design
CMAT-V builds upon CMAT, a compiled memory analysis tool for static
forensic analysis [Oko10a][Oko10b]. CMAT parses through a memory dump file to
extract current users, open network ports, active processes, driver information, open files
and registry keys.
Figure 16 shows the CMAT memory analysis process.
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Figure 16. CMAT Memory Analysis Process
Adapted from [Oko10b].

First, the addressing mode is detected as well as the location of the kernel page
directory table base. Using this information, the location of the kernel executable and
tcpip.sys are found.

Then, the kernel executable’s globally unique identifier

(GUID) and age are found. This GUID is a 32 character hexadecimal character string
designed to uniquely identify a particular OS installation. The age is a one byte ID that
denotes the linking level during compilation. Next, using the GUID and age, CMAT
looks up semantic information by downloading a program database (PDB) file from
Microsoft Symbol Server. The PDB file acts as a road map to give context to the data
read from the memory dump file. Then this process is repeated for tcpip.sys so that
key data structures can be identified which provide information about UDP and TCP
network activity.
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Finally, with the PDB information acquired, CMAT can extract process, registry
user and network information. This is accomplished using previously developed
techniques [Sch06][Dol08]. Schuster describes search patterns that can be used to scan a
memory dump for process objects. Once found, these objects reveal active processes
information [Sch06]. Dolan-Gavitt presents tools that also use a memory dump to locate
register hives and use cell indices to locate specific key addresses in kernel memory. In
addition, the Configuration Manager can be located which provides information about
which keys are being accessed and what processes are accessing them [Dol08]. Using
these same techniques, the registry can also be searched to find the users logged on to the
system. For example, the registry keys located in the Windows registry directory
\Microsoft\Windows_NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList
contain information on about all users on the system. After these final steps, CMAT then
presents the user with an interactive user interface to review the results. This process
forms the foundation of CMAT-V.
Rather than use a memory dump file, CMAT-V is a prototype VMI application
designed to conduct live forensic analysis of Windows-based guest VMs. Though the
static analysis techniques used by CMAT are applicable for most virtualization software
packages, CMAT-V is designed for compatibility with Xen [Mat08] virtualization
software. Xen supports both paravirtualization and full virtualization modes. Because
CMAT-V targets proprietary Windows-based guests, Xen is run in full virtualization
mode. Figure 17 shows the overall CMAT-V architecture.
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Figure 17. CMAT-V Architecture.
As shown on the left of Figure 17, CMAT-V utilizes Xen’s built in Hypervisor
Management API (HM-API) to manage and monitor VM guests. The interface for the
HM-API resides in a trusted Dom0 VM and uses the CentOS 5 operating system.
CMAT-V also uses a modified version of XenAccess [Pay07] as a framework to interface
between Xen and CMAT functions. Both Xen and XenAccess were chosen due their
open source availability.

CMAT, XenAccess and Xen are all written in the C

programming language. This allows custom modifications to be made to achieve desired
VMI functionality.
All software development and experiments are conducted on a Dell Latitude
D630 laptop with an Intel Core 2 Duo T7300 processor, 2 GB of memory and a 120 GB
hard drive.

The processor includes Intel-VT technology which allows HAV mode

operation.

The OS used for VM guests during the malware attack scenarios and

benchmarks is Windows XP SP3 with all available updates installed as of 6/10/2010.
Each VM is configured with 512 MB of RAM, 10 GB hard disk memory and is allocated
one CPU processor. The Dom0 OS is CentOS 5 which is allocated the RAM not being
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used by VMs and the HM-API is allocated both CPUs. All Windows-based automatic
update features, screensavers or any processes that could possibly interrupt the
experiment are turned off in the VM and HM-API. Detailed procedures on how to install
and set up Xen and the Windows XP virtual machines are described in Appendix A;
instructions for installing CMAT-V are in Appendix B.

3.2.2. Software Integration
In order to create CMAT-V, this research made several enhancements to both
CMAT and XenAccess. These enhancements are shown in yellow in Figure 18 and are
further described.

CMAT (modified)

Microsoft
Symbol
Server

Modified User
Interface

Extract Registry
Information

File Stream
Functions
Populate XA_INSTANCE

Live-VM Memory
Functions
VM Physical Address

0x010001601
Page Base Addr

XA_INST
_____
____
____

XenAccess (modified)

Virtual Machine 1

Virtual Machine 2

xa_access_pa()
HAV

xc_map_foreign_range()

0x00F69898

Xen Hypervisor | VMM

Offset

Physical Hardware

0x00000100

Figure 18. Enhancements to CMAT and XenAccess.
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First, CMAT-V must ensure that all functions do not assume a particular
Windows distribution. Therefore, the default XenAccess initialization of a structure
called xa_instance was modified.

The xa_instance structure contains VM

specific configuration information like VM number, VM name, size of memory, etc and
is passed to nearly all XenAccess application programming interface (API) functions. By
default, XenAccess uses two important user provided files called System.map (or
exports file) and xenaccess.conf to initialize the xa_instance

structure.

System.map contains symbol information unique to the target VM. This requires that
the user of XenAccess has prior knowledge of this OS semantic information. In addition,
they must populate and create the file ahead of time.

The configuration file

xenaccess.conf includes the location of the System.map file as well as other VM
specific information such as VM domain name and OS specific offsets.
To create CMAT-V, XenAccess was modified by removing the dependence on
these user provided files. This involved removing all dependencies on these files in all
XenAccess source files. Once this was completed, CMAT was used to derive semantic
information from the memory itself.

As discussed previously, OS specific symbol

information is downloaded from the Microsoft Symbol Server.
synchronize CMAT and XenAccess such

Care was taken to

that CMAT would initialize the

xa_instance structure with all necessary symbol information before XenAccess
required the use of the structure. XenAccess function calls that required xa_instance
were delayed until after CMAT had populated the data structure.
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Once all these

modifications were accomplished, XenAccess no longer required any user provided
configuration files.
Next, CMAT-V must integrate CMAT with XenAccess and Xen to give
CMAT-V its ability access the live dynamic memory of a VM instead of a previously
captured memory dump file. CMAT-V modifies CMAT so that it can access live VM
memory by calling the XenAccess function xa_access_pa(). The remainder of this
section describes this function and how it is used to modify CMAT.
Given a physical address, xa_access_pa()memory maps the page of memory
from the DomU VM that contains that physical address. The function returns the address
to the mapped page and a page offset to the desired physical address. This memory
mapping process is shown in Figure 19.

VM Physical Address
0x01000160

xa_access_pa()

Page Base Address
0x00F69898

xa_instance

xc_map_foreign_range()
VM ID
VM Name
.
.
xc_handle

Offset
0x00000100

Xen Hypervisor | VMM

Physical Hardware

Figure 19. XenAccess VM to Physical Memory Mapping.
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Parameters to xa_access_pa()include the desired physical address and the preinitialized xa_instance data structure. In particular, xa_instance includes a
value called xc_handle which is used to access Xen’s built in API. Using this handle,
the

xa_access_pa()

function

can

subsequently

call

the

Xen

function

xc_map_foreign_range() which executes the memory mapping and returns the
page base address and offset to the desired physical memory location.
For

live

VMI,

CMAT

is

modified

to

use

data

returned

by

xa_access_pa()instead of CMAT file pointers that read from a memory dump file
[Oko10b]. Most of the analysis techniques used by CMAT are built upon the two
functions fimove() and figetc(). The first function, fimove(), was originally
designed to move to a particular location in the memory dump file. The FILE object that
identifies the stream to the opened memory dump file and the desired physical address
are passed as parameters to the fimove()function. Then the file stream pointer is
moved to the requested location in the file. Once the file stream pointer is in the desired
location, the figetc() function is called to grab one byte from the location of the file
pointer. Once figetc()is called, it returns an 8 byte unsigned integer and increments
the file stream pointer point to the next byte in the memory dump file. This function only
grabs one byte at a time; therefore if you wanted five bytes for example, you would call
figetc() five times. CMAT-V enhances CMAT by modifying these two functions to
support VM introspection.
Similar to a file stream pointer, CMAT-V uses a variable called memory_index
to keep track of the currently targeted location in physical memory. When calling the
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fimove() function, the memory_index is updated to the desired physical address
location. After updating the memory_index address variable, figetc() can be
called in conjunction with xa_access_pa() to access the VM’s dynamic memory.
In order to do this efficiently however, figetc() is modified to keep track of the last
mapped page by the xa_access_pa(). When data is requested from a given physical
address figetc() first checks to see if the address is located within the page that was
last mapped by the function. If the address is within the current page, then only the offset
into the page needs to be changed and no mapping is necessary. The principle of locality
dictates there is a high chance that the next memory request will be located close to the
previously accessed memory.

Using this principle, an algorithm was developed to

significantly reduce the paging overhead. Psuedo code for this algorithm is shown
below.
if requested physical address is lower than memory_index then
if falls below of range of last accessed page then
map new page
else
update offset by subtracting appropriate value
else
if falls above of range of last accessed page then
map new page
else
update offset by adding appropriate value

If the requested physical address is located outside the range of the last mapped page,
then a new page is mapped.

Once these changes are made, the remaining CMAT

functions are now fully compatible using live virtual machine memory instead of a
memory dump file.
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3.2.3. Registry Search Optimization
This research also modified CMAT’s registry search function get_key(). This
function returns the location of the requested registry key value. When CMAT searches
the registry to extract user information, as described previously, it uses a linear search to
find the key value of interest. This linear search achieves O(n) performance. During this
research, it was observed that Windows arranges the registry keys in alphabetical order.
To leverage this convention, CMAT was modified to use a binary search. Using the
function strcmp(current_value,target_value) the algorithm was able to
determine whether the alphabetical value of the string variable target_value,
containing the key of interest, was greater than, equal to or less than current_value,
the key value currently pointed to in the search. If strcmp returns a negative value,
then target_value is further down alphabetically; if a positive value then
target_value is locate earlier alphabetically in the list; if zero then the key has been
found. Using this capability, a binary search was implemented. If the value is not found
(negative or positive return value), then the binary search moves current_value to
the middle (alphabetically) of the remaining entries to be searched. This is repeated until
the target_value is found. CMAT-V’s modified version of CMAT with a binary
search achieves O(log n) performance which performs better than the previous O(n)
performance.
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3.3.

Experimental Design
The objectives of the following experiments are divided among three tests. The

first test, described in Section 3.3.1, evaluates CMAT-V’s ability to provide VM state
information to detect different malware attacks running in a VM. The second test,
described in Section 3.3.2, measures any detectable memory latency within the VM itself
caused by CMAT-V’s live analysis. This test also demonstrates CMAT-V’s ability to
scan two simultaneously executing VMs. The third test, described in Section 3.3.3,
measures CMAT-V’s impact on host performance within the Xen’s Dom0 Hypervisor
Management API.

3.3.1. Threat Awareness Testing
The objective of this test is to evaluate the effectiveness of CMAT-V for
providing evidence of malware attacks. With this evidence, network operators can make
classifications about the state of the system and determine the defensive actions required.

Malware
Attack
Scenario

Load Debug
Data

Load Registry
and Process
Data

Get Acti ve
Users

Load User
Process Info

Evidence of
Malware
Presence

Load tcpip
Data

Figure 20. System Under Test: Malware Attack.
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Metric

Workload

CMAT-V Program

The hypothesis for these tests is that CMAT-V can effectively provide evidence of
malware attacks. An overview of the system under test for is shown in Figure 20.
The tested CMAT-V subroutines include functions to load debug data, get active
user information, load registry and process data, link process data with users and load
tcpip data. The left side of Figure 20 shows that the workload to CMAT-V includes
selected malware attack scenarios. The malware attacks for this experiment focus on the
rootkit class of malware because they are known to hide information from the user. A
rootkit is “a set of programs and code that allows a permanent or consistent, undetectable
presence on a computer” [Hog06].

Many rootkits are designed to gain access to

administrator level privileges without being detected [Sko03]. Once system access is
attained, payloads can be delivered to the target system. The right side of Figure 20
shows that the metric for this test is evidence of the malware presence. The nature of the
evidence needed for successful detection is dependent on the type of malware being
executed on the system. These malware attack scenarios are later described in detail
Sections 3.3.1.1 through 3.3.1.4.
Target Virtual Machine

DomU

Malware
Attack

Hypervisor
Management API
Live Analysis

HAV
Xen Hypervisor | VMM

CentOS 5

Physical Hardware

Figure 21. VM System Configuration: Malware Attack.
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Dom0

CMAT-V

Unless otherwise specified, only one VM is used to represent the system under
attack. The VM system configuration for this test is shown in Figure 21 . CMAT-V is
used to conduct live analysis on the target virtual machine. The target virtual machine is
then subjected to the malware attack and the changes in CMAT-V results are observed.
During

the

malware

attacks,

CMAT-V

is

run

in

its

default

-virt_live live analysis mode, which provides the user with interactive menus to
further analyze the results.
For this series of tests, the performance of CMAT-V is evaluated for four
different malware scenarios. The names of the malware used for each scenario are FU,
Hacker Defender, Vanquish and HideProcessHookMDI [Var10b]. These rootkits are
selected because they are open source and are well documented. Though malware in the
“wild” is often unpredictable and its behavior unknown, well-known malware is chosen
so that their existence can be clearly identified. Descriptions and implementations of
each attack are outlined in Sections 3.3.1.1 through 3.3.1.4.

The last entry in the

description lists the evidence-of-interest to detect the associated attack. Whether or not
these elements of the attack are identified by CMAT-V serve as the metric for these tests.

3.3.1.1. Attack Scenario 1: FU Rootkit [Var10b]
Malware Description: This is a direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) rootkit.
DKOM aims to gain kernel level privilege (Ring0) access, then leverage and modify
known OS specific architectures. FU.exe gains access to kernel level privilege by
loading a false driver called msdirectx.sys. Instructions given via the command line
to FU.exe are passed to the driver. With the driver’s escalated privilege level, it is able
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to print process information, hide processes, list driver information, hide drivers, set user
security identifier (SID), list available privileges and set privilege levels [Var10b]
[CAT10] .

Additional Software Used:
• Process Explorer

• DriverView

These programs are freely available.

• InstDrv

See Appendix D for details on obtaining the

software.
Attack Scenario Procedure: With this attack scenario, CMAT-V is used to conduct a
scan of the uncompromised VM. Then the FU rootkit is installed and used to hide a
process. Once the process has been confirmed as hidden from the VM, CMAT-V is
executed again and the results are analyzed in attempt to find the hidden process. To
accomplish this, the following procedures are followed:
1) Open Process Explorer, DriverView and Windows Event Viewer.
2) Execute a single CMAT-V scan.
3) Open InstDrv and install the driver msdirectx.sys.
4) Open up a command prompt and launch regedit.exe
5) Launch Windows calc.exe.
6) Launch a command shell.
7) Use FU to hide calc.exe by process identifier (PID).

>fu.exe -ph <#PID>

8) Execute another CMAT-V scan and compare results to first scan.
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CMAT-V Evidence-of-interest:
•

Evidence of the existence of hidden process. Success if CMAT-V is able to
detect the hidden process; failure if hidden process is not found.

3.3.1.2. Attack Scenario 2: Hacker Defender [Var10b]
Description: This is a backdoor program that is designed to exploit vulnerabilities in a
program to gain access to a system. Hacker Defender rewrites a few memory segments
in all running processes while maintaining the stability of the system. Once this is
accomplished it can hide files, processes, system services, system drivers, registry keys
and open ports.

The program also installs a hidden backdoor allowing remote

exploitation [Var10b][CAT10] .

Additional Software Used:
• Process Explorer

• DriverView

These programs are freely available.

• NetCat

• RegScanner

See Appendix D for details on obtaining the

software.

Attack Scenario Procedure: The actions of Hacker Defender are controlled by an
initialization file (ini-file). The contents of the file used for this scenario is shown below.

[Hidden Table]

[Hidden Processes]

hxdef*

hxdef*

calc.exe

calc.exe
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[Root Processes]

[Hidden RegValues]

hxdef*

[Startup Run]

calc.exe

[Free Space]

[Hidden Services]

[Hidden Ports]

HackerDefender*

TCPI: 100
TCPO: 100
UDP:

[Hidden RegKeys]
HackerDefender100
LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDER100
HackerDefenderDrv100
LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDERDRV100

The [Hidden Table] section hides all files and directories which start with the strings
listed below it. Similarly, the [Hidden Processes], [Hidden Services], [Hidden RegKeys],
[Hidden Ports] sections hide processes, service and driver names, registry keys and ports
respectively. [Startup Run] is a list of programs the rootkit will run after startup. The
configuration listed hides all processes starting with “hxdef” and those named
calc.exe. The service and driver names that start with “HackerDefender” will be
hidden

as

well

as

any

registry

keys

LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDER100,

containing

HackerDefender100,

HackerDefenderDrv100,

or

LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDERDRV100. Finally, open connections on port 100 are also
hidden by the malware. Under [Hidden Ports], TCPI is for all inbound TCP traffic;
TCPO is for outbound traffic. The ini-file must be named hxdef100.ini to use
hxdef100.exe in default mode. The VM configuration for this scenario uses two
VMs as shown in Figure 22.
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Figure 22. Hacker Defender VM Configuration.

The

target

VM

executes

calc.exe

and

the

Hacker

Defender

payload

hxdef100.exe. The attacker VM executes NetCat and the Hacker Defender back door
program (bcdli100.exe) to gain access to the target VM. The target VM must have
all additional software installed as listed previously.

With the ini-file created, the

following procedures will be followed. Which VM is being referenced is included each
step as needed.
1) (Target VM) Open Process Explorer.
2) (Target VM) Run the Windows calc.exe program.
3) (Target VM) In Process Explorer, verify the existence of calc.exe.
4) (HM-API) Execute a single CMAT-V scan.
5) (Target VM) Execute NetCat with
>nc -l -p 100 -t -e cmd.exe
This will open up port 100 to listen for a remote connection.
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6) (Target VM) In the command line execute >hxdef100.exe
This will load the ini-file hxdef100.ini and execute the pre-configured
payload.
7) (Target VM) Verify that calc.exe has disappeared from the Process Explorer list.
This confirms that the Hacker Defender payload has been executed.
8) (Attacker VM) Execute the file bdcli100.exe and follow the on screen
instructions with the IP address of the target VM, port 100 and the default
password “hxdef-rulez” to the command line. This will open up a remote
command shell.
9) (Target VM) Use Windows explorer to verify that any files with “hxdef” in the
name have disappeared. This might take a few moments or involve refreshing the
window view to observe their removal.
10) (Target VM) Use the Windows netstat command to verify that port 100 does
not show up as an open connection.
11) (Target VM) Verify with RegScanner that the listed registry keys in the ini-file
cannot be found.
12) (HM-API) Execute a second CMAT-V scan and compare results to first scan.

CMAT-V Evidence-of-interest:
•

Evidence of the existence of hidden processes hxdef100.exe. Success if
CMAT-V is able to detect the hidden process; failure if hidden process is not
found.
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•

Evidence of existence of executable file location for hxdef100.exe. Success
if CMAT-V is able to detect the executable; failure if hidden executable is not
found.

•

Evidence of hidden registry keys as described in the ini-file. Success if CMAT-V
is able to detect any of the registry keys; failure if none are found.

•

Evidence of hidden port 100. Success if CMAT-V is able to detect the open port;
failure if open port is not detected.

3.3.1.3. Attack Scenario 3: Vanquish [Var10b]
Description: This is a DLL-Injection based rootkit designed to hide files, folders,
registry entries and log passwords. Vanquish uses two files, a Vanquish Autoloader
(vanquish.exe) and a Vanquish DLL (vanquish.dll).

Upon execution of

vanquish.exe, the DLL is injected into running applications. The DLL then executes
the exploits to hide any files, folders or registry keys that contain the string “vanquish.”
In addition, vanquish installs a key logger to record passwords from the user log on
screen [Var10b][CAT10] .

Additional Software Used:
• None

Attack Scenario Procedure: The installation of this rootkit simply involves starting the
executable and verifying that the rootkit is active. This attack scenario only requires the
use of one VM. On this VM, the following procedures are completed:
1) Execute a preliminary CMAT-V scan.
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2) Execute setup.cmd and follow the on-screen instructions. These instructions
will simply have you press any key to install the rootkit and then click Yes when
the Windows registry editor asks if you want to add to the registry. Once
completed, all files that have the string “vanquish” in them will disappear. This
confirms that the rootkit is working.
3) Execute a secondary CMAT-V scan and compare results to first scan.

CMAT-V Evidence-of-interest:
•

Evidence of the existence of DLL injection. Success if CMAT-V is able to detect
the DLL in any running process; failure if the DLL is not found.

•

Evidence of hidden registry keys. Success if CMAT-V is able to detect any of the
registry keys; failure if none are found.

3.3.1.4. Attack Scenario 4: HideProcessHookMDI [Var10b]
Description: This is a basic hook of the system service dispatch table (SSDT). As the
name suggests, the SSDT is a table used to locate the call address of a particular system
function
replacing

in
the

memory.

The

hide

process

rootkit

ZwQuerySystemInformation

hooks

function

this
in

table

the

by

SSDT.

ZwQuerySystemInformation is used by programs such as Taskmgr.exe to
get a list of processes executing on the system.

A new function called

NewZwQuerySystemInformation replaces the original and filters out selected
processes and adds the running times of the process to the Idle process [Hog06].
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Additional Software Used:
• Process Explorer

• InstDrv

These programs are freely available.

• Windows Driver Kit (WDK)

See Appendix D for details on obtaining the

software.

Attack Scenario Procedure: This attack scenario only requires the use of one VM. This
particular test involves building and installing a driver on the target VM system. First,
modify the file basic_mdl_flags.c to indicate the process to hide. Open the source
file in a C program in a code editor. At approximately line 142 you will see code that
looks like the following:

if(0 == memcmp(curr->ProcessName.Buffer, L"_root_", 12))

By default, the rootkit is programmed to hide processes starting with “_root_” in the
name. For this test, the program calc.exe is the target process to hide. Therefore change
“_root_” too “calc.exe” as shown:

if(0 == memcmp(curr->ProcessName.Buffer, L"calc.exe", 12))

After making these changes, save and close the file. Now the driver must be built. To do
this, open a command shell for the WDK checked-build environment. Change to the
HideProcessHookMDI directory where the MAKEFILE and SOURCES files are
contained. The HideProcessHookMDI must be in a directory that does not contain any
spaces. Then type the command “build” in the command line. This will create the file
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hideprocess.sys in the sys\i386 folder, which is the rootkit driver to be
installed. Once the driver has been built, the following procedures must be completed:
1) Run the Windows calc.exe program.
2) Open Process Explorer and verify the presence of calc.exe.
3) Execute a preliminary CMAT-V scan.
4) Open InstDriver.
5) Type the location of the driver hideprocess.sys.
6) Click install, then click start to start the driver.
7) Verify in Process Explorer that calc.exe has disappeared. This indicates that
the rootkit is has successfully been installed.
8) Execute a secondary CMAT-V scan.

CMAT-V Evidence-of-interest:
•

Evidence of hidden process calc.exe. Success if CMAT-V is able to detect the
hidden process; failure if hidden process is not found.

3.3.2. CMAT-V Detection and Multi-VM Testing
The primary objective of this test is to measure the performance impact of the
DomU guest machine caused by running CMAT-V within the Dom0 HM-API. In other
words, this experiment tests the assumption that CMAT-V’s live analysis does not
interfere by causing unique memory latency within VM itself. If it does, the presence of
CMAT-V could be detectable by the VM and any malware executing within it. In
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conjunction with interference testing however, this test is also designed to demonstrate
CMAT-V’s ability to scan two different VMs supported by the same hypervisor.
Parameters
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Figure 23. System Under Test: VM Memory Latency
and Multi-VM Analysis.
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Figure 24. System Configuration: VM Memory Latency
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Dom0

Memory Analysis Modes

(No CMAT-V)

Two simultaneously active VMs are used for this test. An overview of the system
under test is shown in Figure 23 and the VM system configuration is shown in Figure 24.
As shown in Figure 23, the system under test for this experiment is a VM called the
benchmark virtual machine.

As the name suggests, the benchmark VM runs the

benchmarks during the tests. The subsystems that make up this system include all Xenallocated resources such as CPU, memory and hard disk as well as load balancing
algorithms used by Xen to manage the use of the VM’s shared resources. As shown in
the top of Figure 23, the only system parameter that is varied is the memory analysis
mode. The memory analysis modes represent different configurations of CMAT-V live
analysis. Figure 24 reveals that these modes are called baseline, direct and indirect.
These modes are described in more detail in Section 3.3.2.1. As shown the left side of
Figure

23,

the

workload

profiles

to

the

target

virtual

machine

include

CMAT-V as well as two benchmarks programs. The benchmarks used are FLOATmem
and INTmem by RAMspeed [Hol02]. These benchmarks were chosen because they are
open source and are advertised to be highly sensitive to memory latencies [Hol02]. One
benchmark is used for each test run. These benchmarks are described in more detail in
Section 3.3.2.2. Finally, the right side of Figure 23 shows that the metrics evaluated are
CMAT-V’s ability to support multi-VM analysis and the data transfer rates reported by
the RAMspeed benchmarks.
The factors under test, shown in Table 4 below, include the RAMspeed
benchmarks and the memory analysis modes.
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Table 4. Factors Under Test for VM Performance Experiment.
RAMspeed Benchmark
INTmem

Memory Analysis Mode
Baseline

FLOATmem

Indirect
Direct

Both VMs are installed with Windows XP service pack 3 with all updates installed as of
6/10/2010. The benchmark VM and a secondary VM are the only VMs running within
the Xen hypervisor in addition to the Dom0 management OS. The VMs are allocated
with 512 MB RAM and 10 GB hard disk.

3.3.2.1.

Memory Analysis Modes

Recall from Figure 24 that three memory analysis modes used for this test:
baseline, indirect and direct. Baseline mode does not execute any memory analysis at all,
and therefore CMAT-V is not running in the Dom0 HM-API. As the name suggests, this
mode

is

used

for

baseline

measurements.

Indirect

mode

uses

CMAT-V to conduct static memory analysis on the secondary VM. This VM is used to
simulate the workload of CMAT-V running in Dom0. This secondary VM does not
execute any benchmarks. From the perspective of the benchmark VM, it experiences the
effects of Xen load balancing from the CMAT-V workload, yet the memory of the
benchmark VM itself is not being probed. Direct mode uses CMAT-V to access live VM
memory on the benchmark VM throughout the execution of the benchmark. These
modes require live CMAT-V analysis of two simultaneously running VMs. As shown in
the right side of Figure 23, the success of implementing all memory analysis modes is
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evaluated as a metric.

This multi-VM capability is implicitly demonstrated by

accomplishing the procedures for the VM detection testing that follow.
In direct mode, benchmarks are executed in the benchmark VM (DomU) while
CMAT-V is simultaneously executed in the HM-API (Dom0). Because CMAT-V is
using the Xen hypervisor to access the benchmark VM’s dynamic memory, it is possible
that the benchmark VM itself could encounter memory latencies as VM applications and
CMAT-V negotiate with Xen to access the same memory locations. To evaluate the
possible impact of CMAT-V to the benchmark VM’s memory access performance, the
benchmarks chosen specifically exercise the system’s memory read/write functions. Any
decrease in benchmark performance observed while in CMAT-V direct mode would
suggest that CMAT-V is interfering with the VM. It is hypothesized that due to Xen’s
abstraction of the guest resources from the host and associated API, this interference will
not be observed.
Memory latency is not the only factor that might decrease benchmark
performance within the benchmark VM while CMAT-V is running. A lower benchmark
data transfer rate due to the Xen hypervisor sharing hardware resources, such as the CPU,
between DomU and Dom0 processes could be observed as well.

This particular

slowdown would not be specifically caused by CMAT-V, but would occur for any
program that is competing for execution time on the same CPU. Since this test is
designed to specifically target memory latency, measures must be taken to isolate system
sensitivity to that caused strictly by CMAT-V’s live VM memory access. For this reason,
the indirect mode becomes necessary.
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Recall that indirect mode creates a similar CMAT-V workload to the Xen
hypervisor as experienced in direct mode, but the benchmark VM is not actively being
probed by CMAT-V. This means decreased benchmark performance within the
benchmark VM is strictly caused by Xen’s resource sharing features and not by memory
latencies caused by CMAT-V. The benchmark performance from CMAT-V indirect and
direct modes is then compared. Using these tests, any decreased benchmark performance
within the benchmark VM specifically caused by CMAT-V accessing its dynamic
memory can be further isolated.
In addition, it is important to correctly configure Xen’s CPU management. Xen
allocates each VM a certain number of virtual CPUs (VCPUs). For multi-processor
systems it is possible to restrict certain VMs to only use certain processors. The default
VCPU configuration used for this test is shown below.
Name
Domain-0
Domain-0
WINXP_BenchVM
WINXP_SecondVM

ID VCPUs
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
0

CPU State
0
r-1
r-0
--0
-b-

Time(s)
1836.6
985.3
7.8
9.8

CPU Affinity
0
1
any cpu
any cpu

The host (Domain-0) is allocated two VCPUs and is assigned two processors (0 and 1).
WINXP_BenchVM and WINXP_SecondVM are configured to allow Xen to allocate any
available processor. This configuration is preferable because it is less affected by Xen’s
load balancing which restricts the performance of VM guests [Mat08]. This restriction is
necessary to prevent misbehaving guest VMs from consuming too many resources. For
this series of tests however, it is important that the VM under test is not significantly
affected by load balancing. For this reason, the VMs are configured to use any processor
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available.

In addition, this default mode is more robust for determining CMAT-V

detection because it does not assume a specific CPU/VCPU assignment.

3.3.2.2. RAMspeed Benchmarks
This test uses the RAMspeed benchmark suite [Hol02].

RAMspeed is a

command line benchmark that measures the effective bandwidth of both dynamic cache
and memory. In particular, the INTmem and FLOATmem benchmarks are chosen as the
workloads for this experiment. Both integer and floating point benchmarks are used to
represent real life workloads that conduct both integer and float based calculations.
INTmem Benchmark - This benchmark consists of the following four subtests: copy,
scale, add and triad. Copy simply transfers data from one memory location to another (A
= B). Scale modifies the value before transferring the data by multiplying the value by a
constant (A = m*B). Add reads two memory locations adds them together and stores the
result into a third location (A = B + C). Triad merges all three instructions together by
reading from two memory locations, multiplying one by a constant, adding them together
and then storing the result (A = m*B +C). The last result provided by the benchmark is
an average of the performance of all four subtests. INTmem uses double (32 bit) words
and can be configured to transfer a variable amount of data per pass. The result of this
benchmark is the data transfer rate in megabytes per second (MB/s).
FLOATmem Benchmark - Similar to INTmem, FLOATmem executes the copy, scale,
add and triad subtests. The last value averages the performance from all four subtests
together. Unlike INTmem however, FLOATmem uses quad (128 bit) words. The result
of this benchmark is the data transfer rate in megabytes per second (MB/s).
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Each benchmark configuration is run 100 times for both direct and indirect
memory analysis modes. For both benchmarks, 50 measurements are taken both before
and after the active CMAT-V measurements, to ensure baseline consistency throughout
the test. For example, when running either benchmark the configuration sequence is
shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Configuration Sequence for VM Performance Experiment.
Number of Runs

Memory Analysis Mode

50

Baseline

100

Indirect

50

Baseline

100

Direct

50

Baseline

This results in a total of 350 runs for each benchmark. There is nothing inherently
special about choosing 100 runs for the analysis modes and 50 for each baseline. These
numbers were selected as starting points because they were hypothesized to be enough
runs for the data collected to stabilize at a certain range or for any trends to be noticed. In
addition, it is advantageous for the number of baseline measurements to meet or exceed
that of the memory analysis modes because the baseline is used as a standard to compare
with other results. Also, by conducting baseline measurements before and after the
configuration under test, any changes in overall system performance throughout the
experiment can be observed. Ultimately, however, the data dictates if more precision
(and therefore more runs) is necessary. For example, if the results of the baseline and
direct/indirect modes are very close together, more runs might be required to increase the
precision of the test. For this experiment, these run numbers mentioned are used as an
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initial starting point for analysis and discretion is used once the data is collected to
determine whether more runs are necessary.
The default data size for each pass of the benchmarks of 8 gigabytes is used for
each run. RAMspeed is run using the provided batch mode, which allows repeated runs
to be executed. An example command line for the RAMspeed benchmark is shown
below.

<current_directory>ramspeed-win32 -b 3 -l 100 > data.log

The ‘-b’ indicates the benchmark ID. In the above example, ID 3 is selected which is the
INTmem benchmark. The ‘-l’ indicates that the benchmark will be run in batch mode
and the example shows this benchmark will run 100 times.

The output from the

benchmark is then stored in the file data.log.
When running the benchmarks, CMAT-V is run continuously by using a bash
script that repeatedly executes CMAT-V. An example bash script is shown below.

for(( ; ; ))
do
/xenaccess/examples/cmat -virt_live_bench 1
done

The -virt_live_bench mode configures CMAT-V to immediately exit after one
iteration through the program. Using this bash script, CMAT-V is then immediately
restarted.
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One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests that use student’s t-test are used to
determine whether there are significant differences in performance between the baselines,
between the baselines and active CMAT-V modes and between the CMAT-V direct and
indirect modes. Real-world user workloads on a given system often vary over time,
therefore when determining the baseline variation only the average RAMspeed subtest is
considered. The averaged data combines the performance of the other four subtests. The
variation baseline measurements based on this subtest provides a generalization of overall
system state variation. ANOVA tests are conducted using a 95% confidence interval
assuming normal distributions.

3.3.3. Host System Performance Testing
The objective of these experiments is to measure the host system overhead
required to run CMAT-V within the Xen’s HM-API. This test is different from the
previous test because benchmarks are run in the HM-API rather than a particular VM.
Because the HM-API has complete access to the hypervisor, the results from these
benchmarks characterize the performance of all host hypervisor resources, not just those
allocated to a particular VM. The hypothesis for this series of experiments is that
executing CMAT-V will have a low to moderate impact (>30% decrease) on host system
performance using the selected laptop and hardware configuration. These tests use the
Phoronix Test Suite (PTS) [Pho10] to conduct several Linux-based benchmarks.
Phoronix was chosen because it is freely available and contains a wide variety of
benchmark workloads. Installation procedures for the PTS can be found in Appendix C.
An overview of the system under test is shown in Figure 25
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Figure 25. System Under Test 3: Host Performance.
The Dom0 HM-API has privilege to use and control all system resources such as
CPU, memory and hard disk. This Dom0 OS must also use Xen’s load balancing
algorithms to share its resources with VMs running on the hypervisor.

Similar to

previous tests, CMAT-V is a workload to the system under test. In addition to the
CMAT-V workload, benchmarks used in this series of tests target memory read/write and
CPU performance.

The PTS includes Linux-based versions of the RAMspeed

benchmarks INTmem and FLOATmem described in Section 3.3.2. As shown in Figure
25, these benchmarks are used as workloads to the system for testing memory read/write
performance.

In addition to the RAMspeed benchmarks, the FFmpeg [Var10a]

benchmark is used as a workload to the system to specifically test CPU performance.
The metrics for the RAMspeed benchmarks are the same as previous tests. Each
RAMspeed benchmark reports the data transfer rate for the copy, scale and triad subtests
as described previously. For the FFmpeg benchmark however, encoding time is the
metric observed. The details of this benchmark are described next.
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FFmpeg - This benchmark uses FFmpeg to test the system’s audio/video encoding
performance. FFmpeg converts an audio video interleave (AVI) video file to a National
Television System Committee (NTSC) video compact disc (VCD) file. The results for
this benchmark are reported as an average of no less than three runs and are reported
seconds to complete the file encoding. The results of this benchmark are in seconds.
To install this benchmark in the PTS, the following command must be executed:
>phoronix-test-suite install ffmpeg
All benchmarks are run within one active Windows XP SP3 VM. This VM is the
only VM running within the Xen hypervisor in addition to the HM-API. The VM is
allocated with 512 MB RAM and 10 GB hard disk. If one VM is instantiated, this leaves
the Dom0 guest 1.45 GB RAM. The Dom0 HM-API is configured with two VCPUs, one
assigned to each processor. The VM is configured to use only one processor but allows
Xen to select any available processor. The factors under test are shown in Table 6 below
and the configuration sequence is shown in Table 7.
Table 6. Factors Under Test for System Performance Test.
RAMspeed Benchmark

Memory Analysis Mode

INTmem

Baseline

FLOATmem

Direct

Ffmpeg

Table 7. Configuration Sequence for System Performance Test.
Number of Runs

Memory Analysis Mode

50

Baseline

100

Direct

50

Baseline
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Fifty baseline benchmark measurements run without CMAT-V in execution are
run before and after each benchmark test as shown in Table 7. This results in a total of
200 runs for each benchmark. Using the same reasoning mentioned in Section 3.3.2, 100
runs for direct mode and 50 for each baseline mode are used as a starting point and
discretion is used to determine if more runs are necessary. The FFmpeg benchmark uses
the Phoronix batch mode so that the any user prompts are automated. The batchmode
setup is run by executing phoronix-test-suite batch-setup indicating not
to save test results after each run and to run all test options. After this has been setup, a
bash script is run to automate execution. Below is a bash example that runs FFmpeg
benchmark 100 times.
for((1;1;100))
do
/working_directory/phoronix-test-suite/phoronixtest-suite batch-run ffmpeg
done
The output from running the bash script is written to a log file. By conducting baseline
measurements before and after the configuration under test, any changes in HM-API
system performance throughout the experiment can be observed.
One-way ANOVA tests are used to determine whether there is a significant
difference in benchmark performance between the baselines as well as between the
baselines and with CMAT-V in execution. Similar to the test in Section 3.3.2, real-world
user workloads on a given system often vary over time, therefore when determining the
baseline variation only the average RAMspeed subtest is considered. The averaged data
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combines the performance of the other four subtests.

The variation baseline

measurements based on this subtest provides a generalization of overall system state
variation.

ANOVA tests are conducted using a 95% confidence interval assuming

normal distributions.
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IV. Results
The following sections detail the results of all experiments. Section 4.1 describes
results from the threat awareness tests. Section 4.2 describes the results from the VM
performance testing. Section 4.3 describes the results from the host system performance
testing. Section 4.4 summarizes and discusses any general conclusions made from the
results.

4.1.

Threat Awareness
A summary of the results from the threat awareness testing are shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Threat Awareness Results.
Malware Attack

Evidence of Interest

Result

FU

Hidden Processes

Success

Hidden Processes

Success

Hidden Files

Success

Hidden Registry Keys

Inconclusive

Hidden Port

Success

DLL injection

Success

Hidden Registry Keys

Inconclusive

Hidden Processes

Success

Hacker Defender

Vanquish

HideProcess

For each test a successful result indicates that CMAT-V provided evidence of the
malware attack. For those results that were inconclusive, CMAT-V did not confirm nor
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deny the presence of the malware being tested. These results are described further in
Sections 4.1.1 through 4.1.4 and final conclusions are discussed in Section 4.1.5.

4.1.1. FU Results
The evidence-of-interest for this attack scenario was to determine if CMAT-V
could detect the process calc.exe after it has been hidden from the target VM.
CMAT-V was successful in detecting the hidden process. A screenshot of the process
detection is shown in Figure 26.

Figure 26. CMAT-V Hidden Process Detection for FU Rootkit.
The right side of Figure 26, shows the active processes reported from the target
VM via Process Explorer. The left side of Figure 26 shows the active processes reported
by CMAT-V. The process calc.exe with the process identifier (PID) of 884 is absent
from the Process Explorer application. This process however is captured by CMAT-V,
as shown by the red box. CMAT-V also reports a “No” result under the InProcList
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column for calc.exe. This means that CMAT-V has identified this process as
missing from the Windows executive process (EPROCESS) list.

4.1.2. Hacker Defender Results
The first evidence-of-interest for this attack scenario was the detection of the
hidden executable hxdef100.exe. CMAT-V was successful in detecting the hidden
process. A screenshot of the process detection is shown in Figure 27.

Figure 27. CMAT-V Hidden Process Detection for Hacker Defender.

Like in Figure 26, the right side of Figure 27 shows the active process list reported by the
VM (via Windows Task Manager), while the left side shows the same reported by
CMAT-V. The PID of the hxdef100.exe process is 1640. The screenshot shows no
evidence of hxdef100.exe in the task manager of the target VM; however, CMAT-V
was able to detect this process (as shown in the red box).
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The second evidence-of-interest was CMAT-V’s ability to detect hidden files on
the target VM. Using the CMAT-V interface, the process hxdef100.exe was selected
and process environment information was requested.

This description includes

information about the location of the executable, command line arguments used to
execute, the title of any windows open and the DLL path(s) used by the executable. The
process environment information for hxdef100.exe is shown in the bottom half of
Figure 28.

Figure 28. CMAT-V Hidden File Detection for Hacker Defender.
The particular information of interest for this test is the location of the executable. The
red box in Figure 28 shows that the detected executable originated from the path
C:\Documents and Settings\ddodge\My Documents\ROOTKITS\hxdef100r\.
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According to the VM file system however (as shown at the top of Figure 28), this folder
does not exist. This successfully demonstrates how CMAT-V can be used to detect files
and folders hidden from the VM itself.
The third evidence-of-interest for this scenario are hidden registry keys used by
the

rootkit.

The

only

registry

information

shown

by

CMAT-V

is

REGISTRY/MACHINE/ which only indicates the root-level registry key. Due to the
large number of registry keys and values, CMAT-V is not currently designed to search
for and display all registry keys for each process. In light of this, the presence of the
malware cannot be confirmed or denied by observing the registry information provided
by CMAT-V.

Figure 29. CMAT-V Hidden Port Detection for Hacker Defender.
The final desired piece of evidence is the presence of the open port 100. A screenshot of
the results is shown in Figure 29. As shown at the top half of Figure 29 the VM
netstat command reports no open connections; however, CMAT-V accurately detects
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a connection at port 100 for the NetCat process nc.exe (shown in the red box).
Though the port connection is detected, the local and remote internet protocol (IP)
address information is not presented. For user datagram protocol (UDP) connections
both the local and remote addresses are detectable by CMAT-V. For transmission control
protocol (TCP) connections however, CMAT-V is currently unable to retrieve IP address
information and is described as a focus for future development in Chapter 5. Currently,
for both TCP and UDP, CMAT-V provides evidence of an open port hidden from the VM
guest. In doing so, CMAT-V provides user information to guide further investigation on
the guest machine.

4.1.3. Vanquish Results
The attack scenario that includes the Vanquish rootkit first tests CMAT-V’s
ability to provide evidence of DLL injection and hidden registry keys.

Figure 30. CMAT-V DLL Injection Detection for Vanquish.
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For this test, the user-owned process explorer.exe is selected. For each process,
CMAT-V provides a list of all currently used DLLs. The Vanquish rootkit injects its DLL
into every user-owned process. As shown in the red box of Figure 30, VANQUISH.DLL
is detected by CMAT-V.

This demonstrates CMAT-V’s ability to provide

uncompromised evidence of DLL injection on the guest system.
The second test investigated CMAT-V’s ability to reveal hidden registry keys.
Similar to the test in Section 4.1.2, CMAT-V was only able to provide root-level
descriptions of the registries used by a process. Consequently, the presence of the
Vanquish rootkit can be neither confirmed nor denied with this information.

4.1.4. HideProcess Results
The final attack scenario uses the HideProcess rootkit which tests CMAT-V’s
ability to detect a process when hidden using a modified SSDT.

Figure 31. CMAT-V Hidden Process Detection for HideProcess.
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The results of this test are shown in Figure 31. The rootkit is used to hide the
process calc.exe. As shown in on the right in Figure 31, the task manager by the
guest VM does not report the existence of the process calc.exe. The left side of
Figure 31, however, shows that CMAT-V is able to detect this hidden process with a PID
of 3816. For this case, CMAT-V reports a “Yes” in the InProcList column which
signifies that calc.exe is still contained within the VM’s EPROCESS list. This is
consistent with the behavior of HideProcess, as it does not remove targeted processes
from the list but rather filters them out when the list is queried.

4.1.5. Conclusion
For all of the attack scenarios conducted, CMAT-V was able to provide
uncompromised system state information to allow successful malware detection. Of each
evidence-of-interest type, most were demonstrated as successfully detected by CMAT-V.
The registry key detection was the only inconclusive evidence provided by CMAT-V and
future work to improve this capability is discussed in Chapter 5. It is important to note
that CMAT-V is currently designed for VM state view-generation only, providing only
evidence of the system state. CMAT-V does not make claims about the classification of
the VM state itself. In order for a classification to be made about whether the VM guest
is safe or compromised, VM guest requires user interpretation of the results provided.
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4.2.

CMAT-V Detection and Multi-VM Testing
This section contains the results from the VM performance tests to measure the

performance impact to the DomU guest machine caused by running CMAT-V within the
Dom0 HM-API. In addition, CMAT-V’s multi-VM analysis is demonstrated. Sections
4.2.1 and 4.2.2 describe the results from the INTmem and FLOATmem benchmarks
respectively. Section 4.2.3 contains concluding remarks based on the benchmark results
and multi-VM analysis.

4.2.1. INTmem Benchmark
The first step in analyzing the performance of the INTmem benchmark is to
ensure that the data collected reflects normal system behavior. Any uncharacteristic
behavior must be identified and handled accordingly. The scatter plot in Figure 32 shows
the behavior of the INTmem benchmark for the sequential 350 runs.

Data Transfer Rate (MB/s)

2800
2750
2700
2650

Baseline
Indirect

2600
Direct
2550
2500
0

100

200

300

400

Run Number

Figure 32. Scatter Plot of VM INTmem Average Performance.
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The data shown is the average of the four tests copy, add, scale and triad for each run.
These results show that the first several runs of each set encounter distinctively high data
transfer rates. After this initial period, the performance appears to stabilize at a lower
range for the remaining runs. This initial spike in performance could likely be caused by
the time delay for the Xen load balancing routines to evaluate and balance the workload.
These initial runs appear abnormal compared to subsequent runs. The data collected
while the performance is stabilized best represents normal program performance. As a
result, the first 10 runs from each set of runs are not considered.
Recall from Section 3.3.2 that baseline mode does not execute any memory
analysis at all, and therefore CMAT-V is not running in the Dom0 HM-API. In direct
mode, benchmarks are executed in the benchmark VM while CMAT-V is simultaneously
probes the VM from the HM-API. Indirect mode creates a similar CMAT-V workload to
the Xen hypervisor as experienced in direct mode, but the benchmark VM is not actively
being probed by CMAT-V. This means decreased benchmark performance within the
benchmark VM is strictly caused by Xen’s resource sharing features and not by memory
latencies caused by CMAT-V.
With these memory analysis modes in mind, next step is to compare the baseline
performance sets to determine if any factors affect the system state over time. A baseline
is run before the indirect mode testing, between tests and after the direct mode testing. If
any significant increases or decreases in baseline performance over time exist compared
to the modes under test, the effects of the variations must be taken into account. ANOVA
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statistics and box plot of the three baselines are shown in Table 9 and Figure 33
respectively.
Table 9. ANOVA Results for VM INTmem Average Baseline Performance.
Baseline Test
Mean
StDev

1
2684.48
7

2
2676.59
8.02

3
2681.9
9.17

Tests Compared

1-2

1-3

2-3

P-Value [Diff = 0]

0

0

0

Est. Difference
[First - Second]

7.89

2.58

-5.31

Percent Change

0.29%

0.10%

-0.20%

1 = Before Indirect Test
2 = Intermediate
3 = After Direct Test

Data Transfer Rate (MB/s)
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Figure 33. Box Plot of VM INTmem Average Baseline Performance.

The ANOVA results in Table 9 show that the P-value over a 95% confidence
interval is zero when each of the baselines is compared. The hypothesis being tested is
that the difference between each sample sets is zero (the sample means are not
statistically different). Considering the data collected, the P-value reveals that the
probability of this being true is 0%. In other words, the results obtained support the
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conclusion that the baselines measured are statistically different. As shown in the box
plot in Figure 33, it is possible that over time there could be a slight linear decrease in
performance over time, but this is ultimately inconclusive. A more precise
characterization of the performance trend over time would require further testing which is
out of the scope of this study.

However, the data collected does provide valuable

information about the magnitude of the change in system behavior over the course of the
experiment. As shown in the second-to-last row in Table 9, the estimate in magnitude of
the difference between each baseline ranges from 2.58-7.89 MB/s.

Because these

baseline measurements are combined for later analysis, once final results are obtained
these variations in performance must be taken into consideration when drawing
conclusions about the data.
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Figure 34. Boxplot of CMAT-V Impact on VM INTmem Performance.
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Table 10. ANOVA of CMAT-V Impact on VM INTmem Performance.

INTmem
Subtest

Copy

Memory
Analysis
Mode

Mean
(MB/s)

StDev
(MB/s)

Est Difference
(MB/s)
[Baseline - X]

Baseline

2503.6

20.5

-

-

-

Indirect

2406.1

18

97.5

0

3.89%

Direct

2403.3

14.3

100.31

0

4.01%

Baseline

2477.3

15.9

-

-

-

Indirect

2381.8

17.4

95.5

0

3.86%

Direct

2373.9

17.9

103.41

0

4.17%

Baseline

2879.1

11.6

-

-

-

Indirect

2765.7

20.3

113.41

0

3.94%

Direct

2762

19.1

117.14

0

4.07%

Baseline

2864

9.7

-

-

-

Indirect

2755.5

20.2

108.46

0

3.79%

Direct

2751.5

17.5

112.41

0

3.93%

Baseline

2681

8.9

-

-

-

Indirect

2577.3

10.8

103.72

0

3.87%

Direct

2572.7

9.1

108.32

0

4.04%

P-Value Decrease in
[Diff = 0] Performance

P-Value Ind vs Dir
∆ Performance
[Diff = 0]
0.247

Scale

0.003

Add

0.205

Triad

0.163

Average

0.002

After the initial characterization of normal system behavior and baseline
performance has been conducted, the performance of the benchmark under indirect and
direct memory analysis modes is compared. A box plot of the performance results is
shown in Figure 34 and ANOVA analysis is shown in Table 10. Each performance
measurement is grouped by benchmark subtest copy, scale, add and triad as well as the
average of the four subtests. These box plots reveal outliers for some of the data sets.
After further investigation, removing these outliers does not affect the outcomes from the
data; therefore they are retained. This convention is used throughout the remainder of
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Chapter 5. Outliers that are significant to the outcome from the data are explained and
handled accordingly.
An initial look at the box plot reveals that for both indirect and direct analysis
modes, the data transfer rate is reduced compared to the baseline. In addition, the
magnitude of the reduction in performance of the direct mode appears to be similar or
slightly lower than that of the indirect mode. Further ANOVA analysis, as shown in
Table 10, reveals that these conclusions are accurate.
For each memory analysis mode, the mean and standard deviation is calculated
for each INTmem subtest. Within each subtest the sets of performance data are then
compared. The estimate of the difference between the baseline and the indirect or direct
memory analysis modes are calculated. The column labeled “Decrease in Performance”
in Table 10 shows that while CMAT-V is running (indirect or direct mode) the decrease
in performance ranges from 3.86% to 4.17%. This supports the expected conclusion that
executing CMAT-V impacts VM benchmark performance.
The next step in the analysis is to attempt to determine if there is a significant
difference in the decrease in performance between indirect and direct modes. If such a
significant difference exists, it is possible that this could be attributed to the live-memory
introspection, suggesting that it is detectable by the VM itself. The estimated difference
compared to the baseline between indirect and direct modes varies from 2.81 to 7.91
MB/s. To more accurately quantify the difference, or lack thereof, the mean baseline for
each subtest is used to calculate the change in performance for each run conducted. This
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calculation assumes a constant baseline for comparison purposes. The calculation of the
difference in performance for each subtest is shown in (1) and (2).
   ,  , … 
  % , % , … %

! ∆# , ∆# , .. ∆#

(1)

! ∆& , ∆& , .. ∆&

(2)

The variable µ B is the mean baseline performance for the subtest, I is the
performance with indirect mode and D is the performance in direct mode for each run n.
The change in performance results is calculated for both indirect and direct memory
analysis modes represented as ∆# and ∆& respectively.
As a simple example, consider the case where a copy subtest baseline mean is
µ B = 2300 MB/s.

Further consider the case where the data set from the indirect

benchmark results for the copy subtest was I = {2200, 2150, 2253, 2215, 2126} MB/s; for
the direct benchmark results D = {2290, 2157, 2200, 2101, 2036} MB/s. To calculate the
change in performance for each memory analysis mode, calculations would be made for
the indirect mode as shown in 3-6.
∆# ! ∆# , ∆# , ∆#' , ∆#( , ∆#)

(3)

! *   +, *   +, *  ' +, *  ( +, *  ) +

(4)

! *2300  2200+, *2300  2150+, *2300  2235+,
(5)
*2300  2215+, *2300  2126+
! 100, 150, 47, 85, 174
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(6)

Similarly, calculations are made for direct mode as shown in 7-10.
∆& ! ∆& , ∆& , ∆&' , ∆&( , ∆&)

(7)

! *  % +, *  % +, *  %' +, *  %( +, *  %) +

(8)

! *2300  2290+, *2300  2157+, *2300  2200+,
(9)
*2300  2101+, *2300  2036+
! 10, 143, 100, 99, 264

(10)

Now that both as ∆# and ∆& have been calculated, ANOVA testing is be used to compare
these two data sets. Using a two-sample t-test reveals that the P-value is 0.808 which
means there is an 80.8% probability that the sample population means are not statistically
different.
Using the data from the experiment, a similar ANOVA test is conducted for each
subtest to determine whether or not there is a significant difference in the change in
performance. The results of this analysis are shown in the far right column in Table 10.
By convention, any P-value above 0.1 when testing for a difference of zero suggests that
the sample populations are not statistically different. As such, the results indicate that the
scale and average subtests are statistically different while the copy, add and triad subtests
are not statistically different. However, the change in system state over time must now
be considered. The change in performance observed between memory analysis modes
(2.81 to 7.91 MB/s) is within the same magnitude as the variation in baseline
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performance measured over the course of the experiment (2.85 to 7.89 MB/s). As a
consequence, it is highly likely that the difference in memory analysis mode performance
is heavily influenced by change in system state. This means that changes in performance
strictly due to alternating memory analysis modes could be masked or do not exist. In
summary, when taking changes in baseline performance in account, the data does not
reveal any statistically significant differences in performance between indirect and direct
analysis modes.

4.2.2. FLOATmem Performance
Similar to Section 4.2.1, the first step in analyzing the performance of the
FLOATmem benchmark is to ensure that the data collected reflects normal system
behavior. The results for the 350 runs completed are shown in Figure 35.
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Figure 35. VM Analysis: FLOATmem Scatter Plot of Average.
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Similar to the INTmem analysis, these results show that the first several runs of each set
encounter distinctively high data transfer rates. This initial spike in performance could
likely be caused by the time delay for the Xen load balancing routines to evaluate and
balance the workload. As such, the first 10 runs of each set are not considered in later
analysis.
Another anomaly in this data set occurs during runs 116 to 122 while testing in
indirect memory analysis mode. During these runs there is a distinct increase in data
transfer rate. Further investigation reveals that, on occasion, when CMAT-V is retrieving
data from the Microsoft symbol server, the request to the server times out. During this
time, CMAT-V halts further execution as and waits for a response from Microsoft.
While CMAT-V is halted, Xen detects this reduction in resource requirements and
reallocates them to other processes, namely the VM running the benchmark. It is no
surprise then, that when CMAT-V is halted the benchmark performance is similar to that
of the baseline measurements which are taken without CMAT-V executing. This stall in
CMAT-V execution is an uncommon occurrence and not representative of typical
CMAT-V behavior. As a result, runs 116 to 122 are also not considered in later analysis.
Next, the baseline performance sets are compared to determine if any factors
affect the system state over time. A baseline is run before the indirect mode testing,
between tests and after the direct mode testing. If any significant increases or decreases
in baseline performance over time exist compared to the modes under test, the effects of
the variations must be taken into account. ANOVA statistics and box plot of the three
baselines are shown in Table 11 and Figure 36.
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Table 11. ANOVA Results for VM FLOATmem Average Baseline Performance.
Baseline Test
Mean
StDev

1
2743.62
5.78

2
2740.04
9.12

3
2743.45
6.37

Tests Compared
P-Value [Diff = 0]
Est. Difference
[First - Second]
Percent Change

1-2
0.04

1-3
0.903

2-3
0.056

3.58

0.17

-3.41

0.13%

0.01%

-0.12%

1 = Before Indirect Test
2 = Intermediate
3 = After Direct Test

2760

Data Transfer Rate (MB/s)
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Before Indirect

Intermediate

After Direct

Figure 36. Box Plot of VM FLOATmem Average Baseline Performance.

The ANOVA test reveals that the there is no difference observed between the first
and the third (P-value = 0.903) baseline sets while a moderate difference is observed
between the first and third sets and the second intermediate baseline set (P-value = 0.04
and 0.056). This is similar to the trend observed during the INTmem test in Section
4.2.1, where the intermediate baseline test performed significantly lower than the other
two. With this test however, the estimated difference in baseline sets range from 0.17 to
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3.58 MB/s which is significantly less than in the previous section. Again, it is possible
that over time a slight decrease in baseline performance could exist.

Though the

characterization of this trend would require further testing, the data provided indicates
that an inherent variation exists independent of the memory analysis mode.

This

variation must be taken into account during subsequent performance evaluation.
After the initial characterization of normal system behavior and baseline
performance has been conducted, the performance of the benchmark under indirect and
direct memory analysis modes is compared. As shown in the box plot in Figure 37, it is
apparent that during both indirect and direct analysis mode, a significant decrease in
benchmark performance exists.
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Figure 37. Boxplot of CMAT-V Impact on VM FLOATmem Performance.
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To further quantify the difference between indirect and direct performance, ANOVA tests
are conducted and the results are shown in Table 12.
Table 12. ANOVA of CMAT-V Impact on VM FLOATmem Performance.
INTmem
Subtest

Copy

Memory
Analysis
Mode

Mean
(MB/s)

StDev
(MB/s)

Est Difference
(MB/s)
[Baseline - X]

Baseline

2564.2

18.8

-

-

-

Indirect

2482.4

19.9

81.84

0

3.19%

Direct

2478.8

26.1

85.47

0

3.33%

Baseline

2557.1

12.9

-

-

-

Indirect

2474.7

22.6

82.44

0

3.22%

Direct

2470.2

17.7

86.9

0

3.40%

Baseline

2925.8

10.7

-

-

-

Indirect

2827.2

21.7

98.59

0

3.37%

Direct

2826.6

24.0

99.27

0

3.39%

Baseline

2922.3

10.7

-

-

-

Indirect

2821.2

20.9

101.8

0

3.46%

Direct

2822.5

21.3

99.82

0

3.42%

Baseline

2742.4

7.4

-

-

-

Indirect

2651.4

9.0

90.99

0

3.32%

Direct

2649.5

11.7

92.87

0

3.39%

P-Value Decrease in
[Diff = 0] Performance

P-Value Ind vs Dir
∆ Performance
[Diff = 0]
0.302

Scale

0.150

Add

0.844

Triad

0.693

Average

0.235

For each memory analysis mode, the mean and standard deviation is calculated for each
FLOATmem subtest.

Within each subtest the sets of performance data are then

compared. The estimate of the difference between the baseline and the indirect or direct
memory analysis modes are calculated. The decrease in performance while CMAT-V is
running (indirect or direct mode) ranges from 81.84 to 101.8 MB/s which equates to
3.19% to 3.46%. This supports the expected conclusion that the benchmark performance
running CMAT-V significantly impacts VM system performance.
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Furthermore, when observing the estimated difference compared to the baseline, for each
subtest the difference between indirect and direct modes varies from 0.68 to 4.46 MB/s
(99.27 - 98.59 and 86.9 - 82.44 respectively). To more accurately quantify the difference,
or lack thereof, the mean baseline for each subtest is used to calculate the change in
performance for each run conducted. This calculation assumes a constant baseline for
comparison purposes. The calculation of the difference in performance for each subtest
is the same as described in Section 4.2.1 and with (1) and (2). The results indicate that
for all subtests the performance of indirect and direct modes are not statistically different.
Furthermore, change in performance observed between memory analysis modes is within
the same magnitude as the variation in baseline performance measured over the course of
the experiment (0.17 to 3.58 MB/s). It is highly likely that the any observed difference in
performance is heavily influenced by unidentified changes in system state. This means
that changes in performance strictly due to alternating memory analysis modes could be
masked or do not exist. In summary, a difference in memory analysis modes is not
observed within the VM for the FLOATmem benchmark.

4.2.3. Conclusion
For all tests the chosen number of runs were sufficient to draw accurate
conclusions about the data; therefore, no additional runs were conducted. Within the VM
itself, a decrease of approximately 3% to 4.5% was observed by executing CMAT-V
within the Dom0 HM-API. In order to completely isolate changes caused by CMAT-V’s
live-memory analysis one must ensure that they have a baseline to compare to that does
not change over time as the system changes. Achieving these conditions however is very
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difficult, if not improbable, to achieve for any system with real-life workloads. Even if
these conditions are met, the existence of VM interference unique to CMAT-V live
analysis remains inconclusive. However, if the system state changes over time are taken
into account, the data collected under the experimental conditions described in this
research support the hypothesis that direct analysis does not uniquely interfere with VM
performance.

Therefore, when under realistic workloads, the accurate detection of

unique interference caused by direct CMAT-V introspection is predicted as highly
unlikely. Finally, CMAT-V was able to accommodate all memory analysis modes. This
demonstrates that CMAT-V can scan two different simultaneously running VMs.

4.3.

Host System Performance
This section contains the results from the performance tests to measure the

overhead of running CMAT-V on the HM-API. Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 describe the
results from the INTmem, FLOATmem and FFmpeg benchmarks respectively. Section
4.3.4 contains concluding remarks based on the results.

4.3.1. INTmem Benchmark
It is first important to note that for this series of tests, there was no abnormal
behavior of interest such that any runs were required to be removed from later analysis.
The performance during the entire experiment is shown in Figure 38.
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Figure 38. Scatter Plot of Host INTmem Average Performance.

Baseline measurements are made both before and after running the INTmem benchmark.
The results of these measurements are shown in Table 13 and Figure 39. These results
show that there is a statistical difference in the baselines measured before and after the
test (P-value = 0). The estimate of the difference between the sample populations is
approximately 21.58 MB/s. This indicates that any calculated increase or decrease in
performance calculated using compiled baseline data will have an associated error of
approximately +/- 10.79 MB/s.
Table 13. ANOVA Results for Host INTmem Average Baseline Performance.
Ba se line Te st
Mean
S tDe v

1
297 1.5
19.3

2
294 9.9
18.5

1 = B efo re Di rec t Tes t
2 = A fter Di rec t Tes t

Te sts Com pa re d
P -V a lue [Diff = 0]
E st. Diffe re nce
[Fir st - S e cond ]
P e rce nt Cha nge
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1-2
0
21.58
0.73%

Data Transfer Rate (MB/s)
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Figure 39. Box Plot of Host INTmem Average Baseline Performance.

The relevance of this difference in baseline in regards to the experiment being conducted
is determined after analyzing CMAT-V performance results. If the difference in baseline
performance is significantly lower in magnitude than the performance difference running
CMAT-V, this trend could be considered negligible.
A comparison of the host performance results between the baseline and direct
modes is shown in the box plot in Figure 40. As expected, it appears there is a significant
decrease in benchmark performance while CMAT-V is executing. Further analysis to
quantify this decrease in performance is shown in Table 14.
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Figure 40. Box plot of CMAT-V Impact on Host INTmem Performance.
Table 14. ANOVA of Host INTmem Performance.
Copy

INTmem Subtest

Scale

Add

Triad

Average

Memory Analysis Mode

Baseline

Direct

Baseline

Direct

Baseline

Direct

Baseline

Direct

Baseline

Direct

Mean (MB/s)

2713.1

2455.1

2704.7

2428.7

3212.9

2894.2

3212.3

2894.7

2960.7

2668.2

StDev (MB/s)

16.5

64.6

16.8

58.4

32.3

67.6

44.8

69.6

21.7

21.2

Est Difference (MB/s)
[Baseline - CMAT-V]

257.96

275.96

318.68

317.62

292.55

P-Value [Diff = 0]

0

0

0

0

0

Decrease in Performance

9.51%

10.20%

9.92%

9.89%

9.88%

Error (+/-)

0.40%

0.40%

0.34%

0.34%

0.36%

The mean and standard deviation for each set of runs is shown in rows 3 and 4 of
Table 14.

As shown in row 6, the samples for the baseline and direct mode

measurements are statistically different for each INTmem subtest (P-value = 0).
Furthermore, for each INTmem subtest, a decrease of approximately 9.51% to 10.20% is
observed. These performance results have an approximate error of 0.34% to 0.40% due
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to variations in baseline measurements calculated previously. Because the error due to
baseline variation is less than 0.5% these errors are considered negligible.

4.3.2. FLOATmem Benchmark
Similar to Section 4.3.1, there was no abnormal behavior of interest such that any
outliers needed to be removed for later analysis.
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Figure 41. Scatter Plot of Host FLOATmem Average Performance.
The performance during the entire experiment is shown in Figure 41.

Baseline

measurements are made both before and after running the FLOATmem benchmark. The
results of these measurements are shown in Table 15 and Figure 42.
Table 15. ANOVA Results for Host FLOATmem Average Baseline Performance.
Ba se line Te st
Mean
S tDe v

1
300 5.7
18.9

2
299 7.2
15.2

1 = B efo re Di rec t Tes t
2 = A fter Di rec t Tes t
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Te sts Com pa re d
P -V a lue [Diff = 0]
E st. Diffe re nce
[Fir st - S e cond ]

1-2
0.015

P e rce nt Cha nge

0.28%

8.47

Data Transfer Rate (MB/s)
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Figure 42. Box Plot of Host FLOATmem Average Baseline Performance.
The results in Table 15 show that there is a statistical difference in the baselines
measured before and after the test (P-value = 0.015 < 0.1). The estimate of the difference
between the sample populations is approximately 8.47 MB/s. This indicates that any
calculated increase or decrease in performance calculated using compiled baseline data
will have an associated error of approximately +/- 4.24 MB/s. The relevance of this
difference in baseline in regards to the experiment being conducted is determined after
analyzing CMAT-V performance results. If the difference in baseline performance is
significantly lower in magnitude than the performance difference running CMAT-V, this
trend could be considered negligible.
A comparison of the host performance results between the baseline and direct
modes is shown in the box plot in Figure 43. As expected, it appears there is a significant
decrease in benchmark performance while CMAT-V is executing.
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Figure 43. Boxplot of CMAT-V Impact on Host FLOATmem Performance.

Further analysis to quantify this decrease in performance is shown in Table 16.
Table 16. ANOVA of Host FLOATmem Performance.
Copy

FLOATmem Subtest

Scale

Add

Triad

Average

Memory Analysis Mode

Baseline

Direct

Baseline

Direct

Baseline

Direct

Baseline

Direct

Baseline

Direct

Mean (MB/s)

2741.9

2500.3

2726.9

2498.6

3270.4

2961.1

3266.5

2958.6

3001.4

2729.6

StDev (MB/s)

22.7

57

23.3

58.6

36.4

60.4

38.6

63.1

17.6

29.7

Est Difference (MB/s)
[Baseline - CMAT-V]

241.66

228.39

309.26

307.82

271.78

P-Value [Diff = 0]

0

0

0

0

0

Decrease in Performance

8.81%

8.37%

9.46%

9.43%

9.06%

Error (+/-)

0.15%

0.16%

0.13%

0.13%

0.14%

The mean and standard deviation for each set of runs is shown. As suspected, the
samples for the baseline and direct mode measurements are statistically different for each
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FLOATmem subtest (P-value = 0).

Furthermore, for each FLAOTmem subtest, a

decrease of approximately 8.81% to 9.46% is observed. These performance results have
an approximate error of 0.13% to 0.16% due to variations in baseline measurements
calculated previously. Because the error due to baseline variation is less than 0.5% these
errors are considered negligible.

4.3.3. FFmpeg Benchmark
The performance of the FFmpeg benchmark over the course of the experiment is
shown in Figure 44.
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Figure 44. Scatter Plot of Host FFmpeg Performance.
Recall, the metric for this benchmark is the number of seconds it takes for the
benchmark to complete. Therefore, higher values indicate a decrease in performance.
The first two baseline runs show a mildly uncharacteristic decrease in performance. The
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first baseline set quickly reaches a steady state while all remaining sets show no abnormal
behavior. Because these outliers are rare and limited in overall impact, they do not affect
any outcomes. As such, they are included in the benchmark data for later analysis.
Baseline measurements are made both before and after running the FFmpeg
benchmark. The results of these measurements are shown in Table 17 and Figure 45.
Table 17. ANOVA Results for Host FFmpeg Baseline Performance.
Ba se line Te st
Mean
S tDe v

1
29.12
0.21

2
29.08
0.16

1 = B efo re Di rec t Tes t
2 = A fter Di rec t Tes t

Te st s Com pa re d
P -V a lue [Diff = 0]
E st. Diffe re nce
[Fir st - S e cond ]

1-2
0.342

P e rce nt Cha nge

0.12%

0.04

30.0

29.8

Encoding Time (s)

29.6

29.4

29.2

29.0

28.8

28.6
Before Direct

After Direct

Figure 45. Box Plot of Host FFmpeg Baseline Performance.

The results in Table 17 show that there is not a statistical difference in the
baselines measured before and after the test (P-value = 0.342 > 0.1). This means that
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intermediate execution of CMAT-V did not significantly affect the performance of the
baseline measurements. This is likely different from previous RAMspeed tests because
FFmpeg is not designed with specific sensitivity towards memory performance. Because
the baseline sets are not different, this indicates limited change in system state over time
which better isolates the cause of performance variation when changing memory analysis
modes.
A comparison of the host performance results between the baseline and direct
modes is shown in the box plot in Figure 46.
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Figure 46. Boxplot of CMAT-V Impact on Host FFmpeg Performance.

As expected, it appears there is a significant decrease in benchmark performance while
CMAT-V is executing. Further analysis to quantify this decrease in performance is
shown in Table 18.
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Table 18. ANOVA of Host FFmpeg Performance.
Memory Analysis Mode

Baseline

Direct

Mean (s)

29.098

32.583

StDev (s)

16.5

64.6

Est Difference (s)
[Baseline - CMAT-V]

-3.4852

P-Value [Diff = 0]

0

Decrease in Performance

11.98%

The mean and standard deviation for each set of runs is shown. The samples for the
baseline and direct mode measurements are statistically different (P-value = 0).
Furthermore, a decrease of approximately 11.98% is observed.

4.3.4. Conclusion
For all tests the chosen number of runs were sufficient to draw accurate
conclusions about the data; therefore, no additional runs were conducted. In summary,
an 8% to 12% decrease in performance was observed while running CMAT-V within the
Dom0 HM-API.

For the RAMspeed benchmarks, variations in the baseline

measurements were also observed, but were determined as negligible.
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V. Conclusions
This chapter provides a summary of key findings of this research. Section 5.1
contains an executive summary of the results. Section 5.2 gives recommendations for
future follow-on research.

5.1.

Executive Summary
The following sections describe how each goal of the research effort was met,

summarizes the experimental results and draws final conclusions based on the data.

5.1.1. Create a VMI Prototype
The first goal identified was to create a prototype VMI tool that accesses live VM
memory, detect the OS executing in the VM and extract system state information.

This

objective was achieved by developing CMAT-V, which utilizes CMAT, XenAccess and
Xen APIs.

During experimental testing, strategic system state information was

successfully extracted from two live VM’s.

This information includes kernel base

address, active process lists, open network ports, registry keys, and system files and
directories. CMAT-V uses out-of-bound view generation. Recall from Section 2.2 that
this is formally described as shown below.
 





CMAT-V uses software architecture information µ to create a view Vext of the system
state Sext observed from the VMM or hypervisor level. Furthermore, the information in
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Table 19 can be added to the VMI utilities summary shown in Table 2 of Section 2.3 to
include CMAT-V.
Table 19. CMAT-V Application Summary.

Name

CMAT-V

VMM(s)
Tested

Xen

OS(s)
Tested

Windows

VMI Pattern

Description

Limitations

Out-of- Band

Detects OS and uses
semantic information
downloaded from
Microsoft Symbol
Server. Reports active
processes, users,
network activity, registry
information.

Depends on
Microsoft semantics
and the availability
of the Microsoft
Symbol Server.
Changing system
state during scan.

For Windows XP operating systems, CMAT-V is binding. In other words, because
CMAT-V detects the Windows version, malware cannot leverage vulnerabilities
introduced with new patches and updates.
The success of the CMAT-V prototype shows that VMI can be conducted on
Windows-based VMs using static memory analysis techniques. These techniques do not
require a priori OS semantic information and do not interfere with VM operation by using
pausing techniques. One limitation to this approach, however, is that the system state of
the VM itself can change during the course of the CMAT-V memory scan. Any changes
that occur between when the scan starts and completes are not guaranteed to be reflected
in the results reported by CMAT-V. If a history record of system state data is kept,
however, CMAT-V is ideal for continual scanning over time without stalling the VM.
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5.1.2. Verify Live Analysis Under Cyber Attack
The second goal was to verify live analysis functionality while under cyber attack.
Four cyber attack scenarios were run to determine CMAT-V’s ability to provide evidence
of the threat. These scenarios focused on rootkit-class malware which are known for
hiding information.

For all four scenarios, while the VM itself often reported no

evidence of compromise, CMAT-V was successful in providing one or more
distinguishing characteristics of the existence of the threat. This confirms that sensors
which leverage the hypervisor’s privileged position can provide uncompromised
situational awareness information for network defense operators.

5.1.3. Evaluate the Detectability of VM Memory Latency
This set of experiments focused on VMI performance within the VM itself. These
tests revealed a 3% to 4.5% decrease in VM benchmark performance when executing
CMAT-V within the Dom0 HM-API. Furthermore, under the experimental conditions
described, the data was not able to confirm VM detection of the presence of CMAT-V’s
live memory analysis. If a stable system state can be maintained throughout all baseline
benchmarks, it is possible that a detectable presence of CMAT-V could be seen.
However, establishing a consistent baseline with memory sensitive benchmarks could
prove difficult because they are particularly sensitive to varying user workloads over
time. Unless this challenge is overcome, detection of CMAT-V is highly unlikely.
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5.1.4. Verify Multi-VM Live Analysis
Another goal was to demonstrate that two different VMs executing
simultaneously could be analyzed to show that the prototype is not limited to one VM at a
time, but can support multiple active VMs. This was demonstrated by using CMAT-V in
both indirect and direct memory analysis modes.
simultaneously executing.

In each mode, two VMs are

By successfully implementing these modes, this research

demonstrated that CMAT-V could conduct live analysis on both of the VMs.

5.1.5. Measure System Overhead
The final goal was to evaluate system overhead.

This

focused on the impact of CMAT-V on the host system.

set

of

experiments

The results from these

experiments, which used three different benchmarks, revealed an 8% to 12% decrease in
performance if CMAT-V is executing within the Dom0 HM-API. The significance of
this decrease in performance will depend on the user’s allowable threshold for the desired
application.

5.2.

Future Work
The following sections contain suggestions for future work. These suggestions

include evaluation and enhancements to the edition of CMAT-V used in this research.

115

5.2.1. Thread List Introspection
CMAT and CMAT-V currently scan the EPROCESS linked list to identify
discrepancies between what CMAT detects and what the target system reports. A similar
approach could be used for the executive thread (ETHREAD) block that contains thread
information for a given process [Rus09]. Each ETHREAD block contains a pointer back
to the parent EPROCESS block. While EPROCESS blocks can be unlinked and hidden
from the OS, the process threads must execute on the CPU, therefore their existence is
known.

Future work should involve displaying running threads for each process. In

addition, cross validation can be conducted by detecting threads executing on the CPU
that point to a parent process not in the EPROCESS block.

5.2.2. Response Time Analysis
In this study, tests were conducted to determine the interference of CMAT-V on
the DomU guest as well as the overhead on the Dom0 HM-API. Another important
metric to consider is the amount of time it takes a user of CMAT-V to retrieve relevant
system state information. For example, if it takes CMAT-V too long to report the results,
then it is likely that it will be impractical to use in the field. In addition, the faster
CMAT-V is able to report results, the less time is allowed for the system state itself to
change while introspection is taking place.

Performance of CMAT-V should be

evaluated by taking timing measurements and comparing the performance of CMAT-V to
similar VMI applications.
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5.2.3. Advanced Registry Search
Currently, CMAT-V only reports root-level registry key information for a
particular process. As discussed previously, rootkits use and often hide registry key
information. If the user were looking for a particular registry key, it would be valuable
for CMAT-V to include a registry key search capability. Similar programs such as Active
Registry Monitor allow users to conduct searches for specific registry keys. This search
capability, however, might take a long time to execute. This will need to be taken into
consideration and optimized as appropriate.

5.2.4. Driver Detection
Many rootkits rely on custom drivers in order to gain access to kernel level
functions. Adding the functionality for CMAT-V to detect system drivers would provide
a more complete picture of the VM’s system state. One possible detection method is to
search for driver objects which represent an individual driver connected to a system
process. Process Explorer is an example of a program that lists the loaded drivers, their
names, version information and load address [Rus09]. Similar techniques could be used
to enhance CMAT-V functionality.

5.2.5. IP Detection
Currently CMAT-V is able to report open port information. Future CMAT-V
development should focus on determining IP addresses of the open ports. With this IP
information, users will be able to determine where the connection is being made and if
necessary, conduct appropriate counter measures.
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5.3.

Concluding Remarks
There is no silver bullet in the area of cyber defense. The cyber domain requires a

multi-faceted approach where network policies, firewalls, sensors, antivirus, etc. must all
be leveraged to deliver synergistic effects. As part of this “cyber-toolkit,” hypervisorbased VMI provides an unparalleled strategic position to achieve cyber situational
awareness. This research, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. There is a well of
untapped potential in the area of hypervisor-based virtual machine introspection. More
research and development needs to be conducted to further this technology. These
sensors are essential to military network defense networks now and will be even more
critical in the future.
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Appendix A:

A-1.

Installing Cent OS 5 Using Xen Hypervisor

Downloading CentOS 5& Making Installation Boot DVD

1. Visit http://mirror.centos.org/centos/5/isos/ for Cent OS 5 download and select
either i386 (for 32-bit) or x86_64 (for 64 bit).1
2. Select a download location (ex. http://mirrors.rit.edu/centos/5.4/isos/i386/).
3. Download CentOS-5.4-i386-bin-DVD.iso (~3.7 GB).
4. To ensure the ISO has been downloaded correctly, it may necessary to conduct a
hash test of the ISO file. To do this, execute the following in the terminal:
md5sum [FILE] where [FILE] is the path to the file CentOS-5.4-i386-binDVD.iso . This will perform a checksum of the file to verify if there are any
errors. This will take a few minutes to complete. Once the checksum is complete
it returns a stream of hex numbers. Take this checksum stream and check it with
checksum in a txt file usually located at the same mirror site used in step 2 (e.g.,
md5sum.txt). If it does not match, try repeating the download (step 3) or change
your mirror site (step 2).
5. Burn ISO to a DVD using CD/DVD burning software (e.g., Disc Burner for
Linux; IMG Burn for Windows).

A-2.

Installing CentOS 5

1. Place ISO disk into drive and reboot the computer.

1

Red Hat. Index of /centos/5/isos. Oct 14, 2009. http://mirror.centos.org/centos/5/isos/ (accessed Nov 7, 2009).
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2. Follow the on screen installation instructi
instructions.
3. When prompted to select additional tasks for CentOS to support, click the
Virtualization check box
box. This will install the Xen hypervisor as well as all
dependencies (including libvirt, and virtual machine manager).

If you are installing
ing Xen after CentOS has already been installed, see for
installation instructions http://www.howtoforge.com/centos_5.0_xen 1.

4. Continue following on screen installation instructions until CentOS install
instal is
complete. When prompted, the system will reboot
reboot.

1

HowtoForge. Installing Xen On CentOS 5.0
5.0. Jun 8, 2007. http://www.howtoforge.com/centos_5.0_xen (accessed
Nov 9, 2009).
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5. Upon reboot you might see the Grand Unified Bood Loader (GRUB) menu to
select which kernel you would like to boot with
with. Select the xen kernel which is
identified by some version number followed by el5xen.. The screenshot below
shows two different version examples. The version installed may or may not
match those shown below.

6. Once you have booted CentOS you can verify the current kernel being used by
typing and executing uname -r in the terminal.
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You should see the Xen kernel displayed.

You are now running in the

paravirtualized Dom0 operating system.

A-3.

Switching to HAV Mode
In order to enable full virtualization with use of HAV such as Intel-VT or AMD-

V. It may be necessary to manually enable virtualization within the system BIOS. This
allows operating systems such as Windows to be installed as a fully virtualized guest in
the Virtual Machine Manager without access to the OS source code. Follow the
following procedures to enable virtualization in the BIOS with the Dell Latitude D630
laptop.
1. Reboot the system.
2. Upon reboot enter the BIOS setup by pressing the appropriate initiation key.
For Dell Latitude D630, press the F2 key.
3. Once in the BIOS setup use the arrow keys to expand the POST Behavior
dropdown. Under POST Behavior, arrow down to Virtualization settings.
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Hit ENTER to modify the settings and change the setting to Enabled.
4. Hit ESC and select save settings and exit
exit. At this point your PC is now
configured to enable HAV
HAV.

A-4.

Installing
alling Windows Using Xen HAV
The following procedure guides you through creating a Windows XP virtual

machine using hardware assisted virtualization
virtualization. To complete this lab you must have
completed CentOS 5 installation as described previously and have a Windows
Win
XP
installation CD.

1. Place the Windows XP installation CD/DVD in the CD/DVD
CD/DVD-ROM
ROM drive.
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2. In CentOS 5 click on the Applications menu bar and go to System
Tools>Virtual Machine Manager
Manager.

This will launch the virtual machine

manager that guides you through creating a virtual machine.

3. In the virtual machine manager click on the local host with ID xen and then click
on

.

4. VMM will then give you instructions on how to create a virtual machine.
machine Click
.

5. In the virtual machine name dialog box type in Windows_
Windows_XP_1
XP_1. And click
.

6. Select the radio button for Fully Virtualized, then click
NOTE: If this selection is grayed out, see Section A-3.
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.

7. Check and make sure the Local install media (ISO image or CDROM) is
selected.

Set the OS type to Windows and the OS Variant to Microsoft

Windows XP x86. Click

.
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8. Click the radio button for CD-ROM or DVD install and select device mount for
your CD-ROM drive.. Click

.
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9. In the storage dialog box select the File (disk image) radio button and set the path
pat
to install your image file (e.g., /var/lib/xen/images/Windows_XP_1).. Set the Size
to be 10,000 MB to allocate 10 GB of hard drive for your virtual machine.
machine Ensure
the Allocate entire virtual disk now is checked. Click

.

10. In the Network
rk setup dialog, make sure that the Virtual Network radio button is
selected and the Network dropdown menu is set to default. Click
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.

11. In the Memory and CPU Allocation dialog set Max Memory and Startup memory
to 512 and set Virtual CPUs to 11. Click

.

12. To finish the virtual machine creation and begin installation, click
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.

13. This should launch your virtual machine and begin installation from your
Windows XP disk..

Follow the on screen instructions to begin installation.
installation

HINT: To return mouse functionality to the host OS (CentOS 5) enter Ctrl + Alt.
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14. Once setup is complete your VM will shut down
down. You should now see the
following in your virtual machine manager window:
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To restart your computer double click Windows_XP_1 to bring up the VM
window (if the window is not open already) then click Run. This will reboot your
VM and launch Windows XP.

15. Follow the on screen instructions to complete Windows XP installation.
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Appendix B:

B-1.

Installing and Using CMAT-V

Preparing Your System

1. First, install CentOS 5 development tools
tools.
edit/compile the C program
program.

These tools will allow you to

In the CentOS 5 host, click Applications>Add

Remove Software and select Development. Check Development Tools and click
Apply. This will download and install all packages. [pic]

2. Close Package Manager and then open up a shell terminal and install the xen
development tools by typing and executing ““yum install xen-devel
devel” .
3. Reopen Package Manager open and install SVN server module for Subversion
server by searching for “svn” and checking the package starting with
mod_dav_svn then click A
Apply and Continue.
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4. Search for “curl” in the Package Manager
Manager. Verify that curl and curl-devel
curl
are
installed; if not, select them and click Apply
Apply. Curl is used to allow CMAT-V
CMAT to
connect to the Internet
nternet.

5. Close Package Manager
Manager. Go to the cabextract website www.cabextract.org.uk
and download the RPM for Linux (e
(e.g., Cabextract-1.2-1.i386.rpm)
1.i386.rpm). This will
allow CMAT-V
V to extract Microsoft cabinet files.
6. Run the RPM and install the package
package. If a message box appears stating it is
unable to verify the software, click Install Anyway
Anyway.
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7. You are now ready to load and compile CMAT-V.

B-2.

Compiling CMAT
CMAT-V v 2.7

1. Copy the file XA_CMAT_2_7.zip to system.

All software is available by

contacting Dr. Barry Mullins at barry.mullins@afit.edu .
2. Extract the zip file to a desired directory.
3. Open

up

a

shell

terminal
terminal.

Change

to

the

directory

/…/XA_CMAT_2_7/xenaccess
/…/XA_CMAT_2_7/xenaccess. Once in this directory type the command
“make install”.
.

4. Once this completes, in the same directory
directory, execute “./configure
./configure” .
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5. Now change to the directory /…/XA_CMAT_2_7/xenaccess/xenaccess
and execute the command “make” .

B-3.

Executing CMAT-V v 2.7

Change to the directory /…/XA_CMAT_2_7/xenaccess/xenaccess/examples
Once in this directory there are several modes of operation to choose from:
./cmat [mode] [parameter]…[parameter]

Static Analysis Mode:

./cmat [file]

This mode implements the legacy CMAT functionality. In this mode a memory dump
file must be provided.

Live VM Mode:

./cmat –virt_live [VM ID#]

This mode uses live VM memory to gather VM state information.

VM Dump Mode:

./cmat –virt_dump [VM ID#] [output file]

This mode takes a memory dump of the live VM, then conducts static analysis on the
memory dump.

VM Benchmark Mode:

./cmat –virt_live_bench [VM ID#]

This mode is similar to Live VM mode except the program will immediately exit after
data has been extracted by introspection. This mode is used when running benchmarks.
Using a bash script with CMAT-V execution in a for loop allows for uninterrupted
execution.
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Appendix C:

Installing Phoronix Test Suite

1) This describes the procedure to install the Phoronix Test Suite on CentOS5.
From the terminal, switch to root and install Phoronix by typing the command
>yum install phoronix-test-suite
Alternatively you may download the suite and install it.

2) You will also need to install PHP 5 CLI hypertext preprocessor by typing the
command

>yum install php-cli

Once installed, run Phoronix Test Suite to display available options by typing the
command >phoronix-test-suite
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Appendix D:

Downloading Software Utilities

The following contains download locations for software utilities used in this
research.

Process Explorer
Process Explorer shows a list of the currently active processes, including the
names of their owning accounts. Additionally, if Process Explorer is in DLL mode, the
DLLs and memory-mapped files that the process has loaded are visible. Process Explorer
also has a search capability that will show which processes have particular handles
opened or DLLs loaded [Rus10].
Download Location: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb896653.aspx

Driver View
“DriverView utility displays the list of all device drivers currently loaded on your
system. For each driver in the list, additional useful information is displayed: load
address of the driver, description, version, product name, company that created the driver,
and more” [Nir10].
Download Location: http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/driverview.html

InstDrv
GUI tool that allows a driver to be registered, started, stopped and removed.
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Download Location: www.rootkit.com/vault/hoglund/InstDvr.zip
NetCat for Windows
“Netcat is a featured networking utility which reads and writes data across
network connections, using the TCP/IP protocol” [Gia06].
Download Location: http://joncraton.org/blog/netcat-for-windows

RegScanner
“RegScanner is a small utility that allows you to scan the Registry, find the
desired Registry values that match to the specified search criteria, and display them in
one list. After finding the Registry values, you can easily jump to the right value in
RegEdit, simply by double-clicking the desired Registry item. You can also export the
found Registry values into a .reg file that can be used in RegEdit” [Nir10].
Download Location: http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/regscanner.html

Windows Driver Kit (WDK)
“The Windows Driver Kit (WDK) Version 7.1.0 is an update to the WDK 7.0.0
release and contains the tools, code samples, documentation, compilers, headers and
libraries with which software developers create drivers for Windows 7, Windows Vista,
Windows XP, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server
2003. This development kit does not contain device drivers for your personal computer.
If you are looking for drivers for your personal computer, go to Microsoft Update for
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downloads, or visit Windows Hardware Help for more information to find device drivers
and hardware. A working knowledge of C programming is necessary to use this kit to
develop Windows drivers” [Mic10].
Download Location: http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/en/default.aspx
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